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Trade in rhino horn is currently banned in terms of CITES, however the last few 
years have seen the establishment of an illegal trade which supplies the 
growing demand for rhino horn through poaching. As a result, a rhino poaching 
crisis has developed in South Africa, this dissertation will seek to analyse the 
theories for and against the legalisation of trade as a method to address said 
crisis.  
In addition to considering whether the legalisation of trade is the most 
viable option, this paper will explore how one would go about lifting the trade 
ban. The latter will involve looking at the proposal for trade to be submitted, as 
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CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION 
The media is awash with reports of poaching gone out of control, while the 
South African public, and international community, is bombarded with gruesome 
images and disturbing accounts of dehorned corpses, disfigured rhinos and 
orphaned calves. The rising death toll, reports of violent clashes with poachers, 
and numerous arrests, bear testament to the booming illegal trade in rhino horn, 
in the wake of what has rapidly developed into a war for rhino. 
The extensive impact of the poaching epidemic on the African Rhino 
population in South Africa is immediately becoming apparent. According to the 
IUCN‘s Species Survival Commission‘s (SCC) African Rhino Specialist Group, 
experts predict that rhino populations could start to decline in less than two 
years‘ if poaching continues to increase at the current rate.1 In light of several 
ineffective attempts and approaches to remedy the situation it seems that the 
current legal framework and mechanisms designed to control poaching and the 
illegal trade are inadequate. The onslaught has seen the birth of several 
organisations solely focused on finding solutions to, and raising awareness of, 
the illegal rhino poaching. The poaching crisis has led authorities to declare 
rhino poaching a priority crime as announced by Water and Environmental 
Affairs Minister Edna Molewa at a Cabinet meeting on 28 February 2013, 
following on the decision taken by the National Joint Operations Centre (which 
is co-ordinated by the Directorate of Priority Crimes Investigations, otherwise 
known as the Hawks).2 Yet the war rages on, marked by escalating violence, 
                                                          
1 Milliken, T., Emslie, E., Talukdar, B. (2012) African and Asian Rhinoceroses – Status, 
Conservation and Trade: A report from the IUCN Species Survival Commission (IUCN/SSC) 
African and Asian Rhino Specialist Groups and TRAFFIC to the CITES Secretariat pursuant to 
Resolution Conf. 9.14 (Rev. CoP15) CoP16 Doc 54.2. Annex 2, CITES Secretariat, Geneva, 
Switzerland at 9, available at http://www.cites.org/eng/cop/16/doc/E-CoP16-52-02.pdf accessed 
on 11 December 2013. 
2 The Department of Environmental Affairs 'Rhino poaching interventions and the position of 
South Africa to the 16th Conference of Parties of the Convention in International Trade in 
Endangered Species of Fauna And Flora (Cites)' available at 
https://www.environment.gov.za/content/rhinopoaching_interventionsandpositionofsa_16copofth
ecites accessed on 17 June 2013. 
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corruption and the increasingly senseless and indiscriminate slaughter of these 
animals.  
At an international level rhino horn, much like elephant ivory, is subject to 
a trade ban implemented by the Convention on International Trade in 
Endangered Species (CITES)3as of 1977 while a moratorium on trade operates 
at a domestic level.4 However, while this trade ban remains in place, poaching 
continues at unprecedented levels and shows no signs of abating. In spite of 
extensive anti-poaching efforts landholders are finding it increasingly difficult to 
protect their rhino populations. 
It is for this reason that proposals to legalise trade have emerged. The 
South African Government appears to support legal trade as a potential solution 
whereby rhino losses may be mitigated. In March 2013 Minister Molewa stated 
that she believes the legalisation of trade is the right direction to take to curb 
rhino poaching.5As a result South Africa intends to make trade proposals at the 
next CITES conference, to be held in Cape Town in 2016. It will be South 
Africa‘s third attempt to do so since 1994.6 At the CITES Conference of the 
Parties held in 2013 (CoP16) South Africa did not propose the legalisation of 
trade in rhino horn. However, what emerged from this CoP were resolutions to 
‗develop and implement strategies to reduce the demand for rhino horn in 
countries of origin, transit and destination‘, and: 
                                                          
3 The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species in Fauna and Flora, Mar. 3, 
1973, 27 UST 1087; TIAS 8249; 993 UNTS 243 (hereinafter CITES); Black Rhinoceros (Diceros 
bicornis) has been on CITES appendix I since 1977 and is rated as critically endangered by 
IUCN. Emslie, R. 2012. Diceros bicornis. In: IUCN 2013. IUCN Red List of Threatened Species. 
Version 2013.2.Available at www.iucnredlist.org. Downloaded on 11 January 2014; White 
Rhinoceros (Ceratotheriumsimum) was downlisted to CITES appendix IIin 1994 but only for 
trade in live animals to ―approved and acceptable destinations‖ and for the (continued) export of 
hunting trophies and is rated as near threatened by IUCN. Emslie, R. 2012. Ceratotherium 
simum. In: IUCN 2013. IUCN Red List of Threatened Species. Version 2013.2 available 
atwww.iucnredlist.org downloaded on 11January 2014. 
4 National Environmental Management: Biodiversity Act, 2004 (Act 10 of 2004): National 
moratorium on trade of individual rhinoceros horn within South Africa. GN 148 in GG 31899 of 
13 February 2009. 
5 J Rademeyer ‗SA pushes for legal trade in rhino horn‘ Mail & Guardian, 22 March 2013. 
6 CoP 9 Prop 17 Amendments to Appendices I and II of the Convention (1994); CoP 10 Prop 28 
Consideration of Proposals for the Amendment of Appendices I and II (1997). 
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[T]o seek sufficient funding to convene a joint CITES ivory and rhinoceros 
enforcement task force for the purpose of exchanging intelligence on illegal 
trade in ivory and rhino horn, and developing strategies for combating the 
activities concerned.7 
In addition, the Department of Environmental Affairs participated in a 
number of ‗rhino related side events on the margins of the CITES 
CoP16‘.8These related to rhino conservation, rhino safety and security and 
rhino economics. 
In the lead up to the 2016 CITES conference (CoP17) South Africa has 
commissioned a series of studies into the rhino horn trade, as dozens of 
questions fall to be considered, including, how it would be regulated; whether it 
will alleviate or exacerbate the crisis; and whether or not it is a viable option. In 
July 2013, the Department of Environmental Affairs (DEA) published the Rhino 
Issue Management Report (RIMR) which provides an overview of the 
conservation status of the rhino and tables the initiatives currently implemented 
for their protection. It also summarises different views on the various commerce 
and trade models available.9 In the RIMR, it is pointed out that: 
Banning of the rhino horn trade by CITES and the concomitant moratorium on 
domestic trade by South Africa has had the unintended consequence of 
increasing poaching of live animals as there is no other horn available.10 
The above statement invites the question of whether the legalisation of 
trade will have the opposite effect. This paper will endeavour to consider this 
question by weighing up the available options and the arguments presented for 
                                                          
7 ‗CoP16 Doc 54.1 (Rev.1) Interpretation and Implementation of the Convention—Species Trade 
and Conservation: Rhinoceroses; MoU signed with China on combating rhino poaching‘ (2 April 
2013) Legalbrief Today; The department of environmental affairs ‗Minister Edna Molewa‘s 
speech at the Portfolio Committee on Water and Environmental Affairs Stakeholder Workshop 
on rhino poaching‘ available at 
https://www.environment.gov.za/speech/molewa_portfoliocommittee_stakeholderworkshop, accessed  
on 6 January 2014. 
8 ‗South Africa participates in CITES CoP16‘ available at 
https://www.environment.gov.za/content/southafrica_citescop16, accessed on 16 June 2013.  
9
The Department of Environmental Affairs ‗Rhino Issue Management Report 2013‘ at 1 available 
at https://www.environment.gov.za/sites/default/files/docs/rhinoissue_managementreport.pdf, 
accessed on 21 November 2013. 
10 Ibid at 22. 
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and against the legalisation of trade in light of the on-going challenges 
encountered in combating the poaching crisis. The paper will also contemplate 
the likelihood of CITES accepting a proposal for trade, and what such a trade 
regime might look like. For the purposes of this proposed analysis, it is of vital 
import to provide the applicable context. This will be achieved in chapter two by 
setting out how the poaching crisis emerged in South Africa, which will in turn 
involve detailing the events and circumstances surrounding the unmanageable 
escalation in poaching, and exploring the manifold factors influencing the 
current crisis. 
However, in order for the picture to be complete one also needs to 
consider the response to the aforementioned factors. In the South African 
context this involves a brief analysis of the applicable legal framework and its 
shortcomings. More specifically, an analysis of the National Moratorium on 
Domestic Trade in Rhino in South Africa of 2009, the National Environmental 
Management Biodiversity Act11 (NEMBA) and Threatened or Protected Species 
Regulations12 (TOPS Regulations). These instruments seek to control trade in, 
and protect species at, a domestic level, thereby providing support to the 
international trade regulations. This chapter will thus seek to consider the effect 
these instruments have had on trade, as well as detail South Africa‘s response 
to the poaching epidemic and the efficacy thereof. 
Against this backdrop, the third chapter of this paper will briefly outline 
the current international regulatory framework with regards to trade in rhino 
horn. The primary focus is on CITES as the vehicle responsible for the 
international ban on the trade in rhino horn, and thus the vehicle empowered to 
lift said ban and provide the guidelines or mechanisms for the regulation of 
trade. This chapter will discuss the operation of CITES and its appendices. 
                                                          
11Act 10 of 2004. 
12 National Environmental Management: Biodiversity Act, 2004 (Act 10 of 2004): Threatened or 
Protected Species Regulations, 2007 GNR 152 in GG 29657 of 23 February 2007. 
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It is important to note that the debate surrounding the merits of a 
legalised trade and how it should be structured is moot in the event that CITES 
fails to accept South Africa‘s trade proposal and hence international trade in 
rhino horn remains illegal. It thus falls to be considered what such a proposal 
should contain, and to outline the procedure to be followed in making such a 
proposal, that is, to amend the CITES appendices. 
The fourth chapter aims to provide a picture of the controversy 
surrounding the proposed trade in rhino horn by highlighting the principal 
theories for and against the legalisation of trade in rhino horn. This chapter will 
also introduce case studies relating to the African Elephant and vicuña and, by 
looking at the degree to which they can be compared to the rhino and rhino 
products, will regard the implications of the legalisation of rhino trade. Further, 
this chapter will conclude with an analysis of the various schools of thought, in 
light of the context provided, and the realities of the current poaching crisis. This 
examination will ultimately form a suggestion as to the way forward, and 
whether legalised trade is the most viable option. 
One of the aspects to be considered in determining whether trade in 
rhino horn is viable is how such a trade will be modelled and how it will be 
regulated. Therefore the penultimate chapter evaluates the Final Report on 
Decision-Making Mechanisms and Necessary Conditions for Future Trade in 
African Elephant Ivory 13(the Report), for the purposes of establishing whether a 
mechanism designed to regulate trade in ivory can be used as a model for trade 
in rhino horn. The Report is a document commissioned by the CITES 
Secretariat, constituting a ―technically-focused study on a ‗decision-making 
mechanism for a process of trade in ivory under the auspices of the Conference 
of the Parties‖.14 This document does not aim to determine whether there should 
be legal trade in ivory, rather, it is intended to provide a template which can be 
                                                          
13 R B Martin, D H M Cumming, G C Craig, SC Gibson, D A Peake Decision Making Mechanism 
and Necessary Conditions for Future Trade in African Elephant Ivory, (SC-62 Doc. 46.4 Annex, 
CITES, Geneva, 2012).  
14 Ibid at 1. 
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used by parties in the event of a future trade in ivory under CITES.15 The Report 
consists of principles for trade, the decision-making mechanism and its 
conditions, and the reasoning behind them. 
In aid of providing a background to the formulation of the Report, the 
history of the international trade in African Elephant ivory, will be detailed in 
brief. This will act as a precursor to an analysis of the aforementioned Report 
through an exposition of its provisions, relevance, and possible application, in 
the context of trade in rhino horn. In order to balance perspectives one must 
also consider any criticism levelled against the proposed Decision-Making 
Mechanisms including, for example, allegations that the study did not provide 
options of decision-making mechanisms.16These arguments are compelling in 
that they are very probable to emerge in the context of a proposed rhino horn 
trade. 
In summary this dissertation will  propose whether legalised trade is the 
next step in the measures taken to address the rhino poaching crisis, and will 
seek to provide recommendations as to the way forward. The final chapter will 
aim to articulate some of the parameters, concerns and conditions to be borne 
in mind in assessing the viability of a future trade in rhino horn, as derived from 
the discussions in the afore going chapters of this paper. 
  
                                                          
15 Ibid. 
16 E Morgera ‗CITES/SC-62: Tackling the Elephant Crisis‘ (2012) 45 4-5 Environmental Policy 
and Law 254 at 255. 
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CHAPTER 2 - THE POACHING CRISIS IN SOUTH AFRICA: THE RISE OF A 
CONTROVERSIAL PROPOSITION  
1. History 
The poaching crisis currently beleaguering Southern Africa, while astonishing in 
its development and intimidating in its scope, is not unprecedented.  Historically 
the rhino has been subject to hunting for sport as part of game control, or for 
their horn which has been used for ornamental and medicinal purposes for 
centuries. By the late 1800s the southern white rhino had been hunted to near 
extinction so that a mere 20 animals remained in Hluhluweu Mfolozi Game 
Reserve in 1895.17Black rhino populations were similarly decimated in southern 
Africa by the 1930s, leaving just 110 animals in game reserves, however the 
general population surviving in Africa remained relatively abundant.18This initial 
decline in the African rhino population is largely attributed to hunting for the 
purposes of land clearance for agricultural and human settlement.19 While the 
black rhino population continued to wane, the southern white rhino 
demonstrated a remarkable recovery as a result of a protection programme 
initiated in South Africa.20 
However, the subsequent recovery was short lived as world rhino 
populations plummeted as a result of increased poaching. Emslie and Brooks 
report that black rhino numbers began to decline in the 1960s, and that between 
1970 and 1995they dropped from65000 to 2 410 animals.21 They attributed the 
                                                          
17 R Emslie (2012) Ceratotheriumsimum In: IUCN Red List of Threatened Species. Version 
2012.2 <www.iucnredlist.org>, accessed on 1 December 2013; Department of Environmental 
Affairs (note 9) at 9. 
18 Department of Environmental Affairs (note 9) at 9; R Emslie & M Brooks African Rhino Status 
Survey and Conservation Action Plan (1999) IUCN/SSC African Rhino Specialist Group IUCN, 
Gland, Switzerland and Cambridge, UK. ix + 92, at 5. 
19 WWF Factsheet  13th Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to CITES, Bangkok, 2-14 
October 2004: Black Rhinoceros Diceros bicornis available at 
www.panda.org/downloads/ecop13blackrhinofactsheet.pdf‎,‎accessed‎on‎25‎January‎2013. 
20 M H Knight ‗African Rhino Specialist Group report 10th Meeting of the IUCN/SSC African 
Rhino Specialist Group‘ 2011 Pachyderm, 49: 6-15; Walker, C & Walker, A The Rhino Keepers 
2012 Jacana Media, Auckland Park: South Africa.  
21 R Emslie & M Brooks (note 18) at 5.  
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increased poaching pressure to demand escalations in Asia and the Middle 
East, particularly Yemen, during the 1970s and the 1980s.22 
Michael t‘Sas Rolfes offers a theory for this sudden rise in demand. He 
suggests that the spike in the consumption of rhino horn coincided with the 
discovery of oil in Saudi Arabia in the early 1970s.23 This discovery afforded 
Yemeni men a plethora of economic opportunities, and the resultant prosperity 
increased the demand for dagger handles made from rhino horn, a traditional 
emblem of status in Yemen.24 In addition, growing demands by Japan, South 
Korea and Taiwan for traditional medicine derived from rhino horn only sought 
to intensify poaching.25As a result of growing demand for the horn and the 
rapidly depleting rhino population, an international trade ban was introduced 
under CITES in the 1970‘s. This ban served as the primary international 
instrument to regulate trade in endangered species. 
It has been suggested by some commentators that the intensive 
international pressure and outcry against the crisis led to the eventual 
abatement of the illegal trade and thus poaching levels. Micheal t‘Sas Rolfes 
claims that the trade ban was a failure initially in that it added to the perception 
of a supply shortage, causing prices to soar. In consequence, black market 
trade flourished, leading to the decimation of the rhino population.26 t‘Sas Rolfes 
maintains that the reason for the decrease in poaching levels relates to 
stockpiling in reaction to the trade ban which provided a steady supply for some 
time, in combination with  the break out of civil war in Yemen, and the fact that 
very few unprotected rhino populations exist anymore27. In any event, the result 
was decreased poaching levels and the subsequent stabilisation of populations, 
                                                          
22 Ibid at 5. 
23 M ‗tSas Rolfes ‗Elephants, Rhinos and the Economics of the Illegal Trade‘ 1997 Pachyderm at 
26. 
24 Ibid at 26. 
25 K Ellis ‗Tackling the demand for Rhino Horn‘ 2013 The Horn at 23, available at 
www.savetherhino.org, accessed on 27 November 2013. 




primarily due to the strategic efforts of South Africa which emerged as the most 
successful range state.28 
2. Emergence of the poaching crisis in South Africa 
2.1. Events and circumstances surrounding the unmanageable 
escalation in poaching: Growing demand and the illegal trade. 
Trade Records Analysis on Fauna and Flora in Commerce (TRAFFIC), an 
international wildlife trade monitoring network, reports that South Africa lost 
approximately 13 rhinos per year to poaching between 1990 and 2007, 
reflecting a period of stabilisation.29 However, in 2008 this number suddenly 
rose to 72 and thereafter escalated so rapidly that 2012 reflects 668 rhino 
poaching incidents.30  This trend continued unabated throughout 2013 with 1004 
incidents reported by the DEA on17 January 2014.31 Poaching is fuelled by 
international and domestic trade bans which in turn results in increased demand 
for rhino products through illegal market channels. Specifically, increases in 
demand for rhino products are attributable to Vietnam which recently emerged 
as a primary importer of rhino horn.32 
The potential explanations for the increase in demand for rhino horn are 
manifold. For example, some are of the opinion that rhino horn is now being 
marketed as a cure for cancer, which is totally unrelated to its traditional medical 
                                                          
28 Ibid. 
29 TRAFFIC‘s engagement on African rhinoceros conservation and the global trade in rhinoceros 
horn available at http://www.traffic.org/rhinos/, accessed on 3 December 2013. TRAFFIC is 
responsible for undertaking numerous studies on the rhino horn trade spanning Asia, the Middle 
East and America, thereby gathering data and a necessary understanding of the illegal trade, 
see R Emslie & M Brooke (note 18) at 37. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Department of Environmental Affairs ‗Update on rhino poaching statistics (17 January 2014 
update)‘ available at 
https://www.environment.gov.za/mediarelease/rhinopoaching_statistics_17jan2014, accessed 
on 2 February 2014. 
32 T Milliken & J Shaw The South Africa - Viet Nam Trade Nexus: A deadly combination of 
institutional lapses, corrupt wildlife industry professionals and Asian crime syndicates (2012) 
TRAFFIC, Johannesburg, South Africa at 58-60.  
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use.33 Others, such as Micheal t‘Sas Rolfes, attribute it to ‗the realignment of 
market supply and demand factors.‘34 The rapid economic growth in many Asian 
countries has led to a greater population in possession of a disposable 
income.35 Vietnam is an embodiment of this new wealth, and features a younger 
generation intent on acquiring luxury products. On account of its skyrocketing 
prices, rhino horn is understood to convey a social status to its consumer and 
thus may be considered a product in the luxury trade.36 
As of 25 February 2013 rhino horn reached a market value of R536 119 
per kilogram, almost double the price of gold and close to the street value of 
cocaine.37 It is the combination of illicit trade, the high value product and ‗price-
inelastic‘ demand that has led organised crime syndicates to become involved. 
While already implicated in exploiting the weaknesses in the regulation of sport 
hunting, and undermining the trophy hunting industry, their role has become 
even more pronounced with the rise of poaching.38 Rhino horn trade syndicates 
are considered by the National Wildlife Crime Reaction Unit to be operating on 
five levels, from the poachers to an international consumer, usually in Asia and 
particularly in Vietnam.39  It is for this reason that poaching operations in South 
Africa and methods of illegal export have become increasingly sophisticated, 
operating with greater efficiency and coordination.40 Furthermore due to the 
                                                          
33T Milliken R H Emslie & B Talukdar (2009) African and Asian Rhinoceroses – Status, 
Conservation and Trade: A report from the IUCN Species Survival Commission (IUCN/SSC) 
African and Asian Rhino Specialist Groups and TRAFFIC to the CITES Secretariat pursuant to 
Resolution Conf. 9.14 (Rev. CoP14) and Decision 14.89.Doc CoP15 45.1. Annex, CITES 
Secretariat, Geneva, Switzerland, pp.19 at 9, available at 
http://www.cites.org/common/cop/15/doc/E15-45-01A.pdf, accessed on 11 December 2013. 
34 M ‗t Sas Rolfes ‗The Rhino Poaching Crisis: a Market Analysis‘ 2012 available at www.rhino-
economics.com, accessed on 12 November 2013 at 9. 
35 T Milliken & J Shaw (note 32) at 136. 
36 Ibid at 136. 
37 K Sharife ‗Is it time to legalise rhino horn trade?‘ available at 
http://mondediplo.com/openpage/is-it-time-to-legalise-rhino-horn-trade, accessed on 13 
November 2013.  
38T Milliken and J Shaw (note 32) at 78-79. 




organisation introduced by the Asian crime syndicates, poachers now meet the 
heightened security around rhino populations with proportionate violence.41 
This situation is further exacerbated in South Africa as a result of its 
proximity to Mozambique. The latter has emerged as an entrepôt and a transit 
country for the movement of rhino horn.42 Not only does Mozambique share a 
365km unfenced border with South Africa‘s Kruger National Park due to the 
establishment of the Limpopo Transfrontier Park, but the wildlife legislation in 
Mozambique is also notably poor.43 Rhino poaching and trading in its horn is not 
considered a criminal offence but a misdemeanour, and law enforcement is 
insufficient, meaning that Mozambican poachers and those willing to assist in 
exporting the horn, are readily recruited by international criminal syndicates.44 
As a result, many of the poachers operating in South Africa are of Mozambican 
nationality.45 CITES has since called on Mozambique to enact and implement 
legislation with the appropriate penalties for wildlife crime, to prevent the illegal 
killing of rhinos and the trade in their horn and to implement the requirements 
arising out of CoP15 relating to the conservation of and trade in African and 
Asian rhinoceroses.46 
The general consensus is that poaching incidents began to rise again in 
South Africa from 2008.47 This phenomenon followed closely on, and coincided 
with the steps taken by the South African Government to address the influx of 
‗hunters‘ intent on obtaining rhino horn for the purpose of supplying the illegal 
market. The introduction of the National Moratorium on rhino horn sales in 
                                                          
41 Ibid. 
42 M ‗tSas Rolfes (note 34) at 8-9; T Milliken, E Emslie & B Talukdar (note 33) at 5. 
43 Save the Rhino ‗Mozambique‘s role in the poaching crisis‘ available at 
http://www.savetherhino.org/rhino_info/thorny_issues/mozambiques_role_in_the_poaching_crisi
s, accessed on 12 December 2013. 
44 M ‗tSas Rolfes (note 34) at 8-9; T Milliken E Emslie & B Talukdar (note 33) at 5. 
45T Milliken and J Shaw (note 32) at 85. 
46 CITES (2013) Rhinoceroses (Rhinocerotidae spp.) Resolution Conf. 16.84 – 16.92 (Rev. 
CoP16) available at http://www.cites.org/eng/dec/valid16/16_84-92.php, accessed on 20 
November 2013; CITES (2010) Conservation of and trade in African and Asian rhinoceroses. 
Resolution Conf. 9.15 (Rev.CoP15) available at http://www.cites.org/eng/res/09/09-14R15.php , 
accessed on 20 November 2013. 
47 TRAFFIC (note 30). 
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February 2009, combined with stricter permitting requirements for the handling 
of rhinos and horn, and greater regulation of the trophy hunting industry as 
described below, have failed to quell rhino poaching in South Africa.48 
In 2006 South Africa experienced an increase in the number of 
Vietnamese nationals applying for trophy hunting permits with respect to white 
rhinos.49 It gradually became obvious that the ‗trophies‘, borne of what has been 
termed ‗pseudo-hunting‘, were in fact being used to supply the illegal trade in 
rhino horn products.50 South Africa responded by applying stricter measures in 
the hunting permit system and by correcting apparent and perceived legislative 
loopholes and ambiguities.51 For example, prior to the implementation of the 
TOPS Regulations a major loophole existed in the form of ‗standing permits‘, 
which are defined under regulation 1 as permits that are valid for a longer 
specified period than an ordinary permit.52 The standing permit system utilised 
in some provinces prior to the implementation of the TOPS Regulations, allowed 
white rhino to be hunted on certain properties without permits.53 This meant that 
rhino could be hunted without the knowledge of local conservation agencies, 
and thus the provincial authorities screening CITES export permit applications 
could authorise the export of illegal rhino horn as they would be ignorant as to 
the legality of the hunt.54 Standing permits are now governed by regulation 5(2) 
which lists persons or bodies that may apply for a standing permit, such as the 
landowner of a registered game farm, who may apply for game farm hunting 
permits with respect to threatened or protected species on the farm if the 
registration requirements under Chapter 3 of the TOPS Regulations are 
complied with.55 
                                                          
48 M ‗tSas Rolfes (note 34) at 8-9; T Milliken E Emslie & B Talukdar (note 3333) at 4. 
49 Ibid at 54. 
50 Ibid at 55-56. 
51 Department of Environmental Affairs (note 9). 
52 T Milliken & J Shaw (note 32) at 56. 
53 T Milliken & J Shaw (note 32) at 38. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Regulation 5(3) of the TOPS Regulations. 
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Another approach to narrowing the potential avenues of abuse saw the 
implementation of new standards in July 2009 which limited hunters to one 
white rhino per year each, and called for national approval prior to the issuing of 
provincial hunting licences.56 It was found however, that syndicates were able to 
recruit individuals to pose as professional sport hunters so as to circumvent the 
limitation of one rhino per year.57 
‗Pseudo-hunting‘ has since been further restricted through the 
requirements that a law enforcement official be present at every hunt, that 
hunters who apply for permits prove that they are bona fide sports hunters, and 
the decision to ban Vietnamese nationals from obtaining hunting permits.58 
Milliken et al suggest that these steps, while successful, have simply contributed 
to the shift towards illegal means of obtaining horn, such as poaching.59 The 
Rhino Issue Management Report adds that syndicates have simply adjusted to 
the new legal regime around hunting in that they spread the applications for 
hunting permits across the nationality profile. 60 In other words, Vietnamese 
nationals would, for example, hire sport hunters from other countries, such as 
Poland or the Czech Republic, to circumvent the restrictions placed on the 
former.61 
2.2. South Africa’s response 
2.2.1. Legal and Regulatory Measures 
a) Legal framework and measures to control hunting 
It is instructive, in assessing the position of the rhino in South Africa, to 
consider the legislation governing the management of rhino populations, the 
                                                          
56 National Environmental Management: Biodiversity Act, 2004 (Act 10 of 2004): Marketing of 
rhinoceros horn & hunting of white rhinoceros for trophy hunting purposes GN 756 in GG 32426 
on 20 July 2009; T Milliken E Emslie & B Talukdar (note 33) at 11. 
57 T Milliken, R H Emslie and B Talukdar (note 1) at 9. 
58 Ibid at 4; Paragraphs 3 (3) and 3(8) of the National Environmental Management: Biodiversity 
Act, 2004 (Act No. 10 of 2004): Marking of rhinoceros horn and hunting of rhinoceros for trophy 
hunting purposes GN 756 in GG 32426 of 20 July 2009. 
59 Ibid at 4. 
60 Department of Environmental Affairs (note 18); T Milliken E Emslie & B Talukdar (note 1) at 5. 
61 T Milliken E Emslie & B Talukdar (note 1) at 5. 
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regulation of activities affecting the species and the protection afforded to 
rhinos. Since 2004 the key piece of legislation providing for the management 
and protection of South Africa‘s biodiversity has been the NEMBA.NEMBA is 
designed to operate within the framework established by the National 
Environmental Management Act62 (NEMA).63 The objectives of NEMBA include 
the management and conservation of the country‘s biological diversity and its 
components, and it aims to give effect to international agreements ratified by 
South Africa.64 
NEMBA provides for the promulgation of norms and standards necessary 
for the achievement of these objectives, including those related to the ‗restriction 
of activities which impact on biodiversity and its components‘.65 Norms and 
standards of primary application to the management of rhinos and their products 
include those for the ‗marking of rhinoceros and rhinoceros horn, and for the 
hunting of rhinoceros for trophy hunting purposes‘ (the Norms and Standards).66 
These Norms and Standards have replaced those governing the marking of 
rhino horn and trophy hunting of white rhino first promulgated in July 200967 so 
as to address loopholes identified in the latter.68 They act to provide specific 
guidance by, for example, specifying that a hunting client may only hunt one 
white rhinoceros trophy per year.69 The aforementioned norms and standards 
are intended to be read in conjunction with the TOPS Regulations governed by 
Chapter 4 of NEMBA. This chapter provides for the listing of species that are 
                                                          
62 Act 107 of 1998. 
63 M Van der Linde & L Feris (eds) Compendium of Environmental Legislation (2010) Pretoria 
University Law Press, Pretoria, South Africa at 119.  
64 s 2(a),(b) of NEMBA. 
65 s 9(1)(a)(ii) of NEMBA. 
66 National Environmental Management: Biodiversity Act, 2004 (Act No. 10 of 2004): Norms and 
Standards for the marking of rhinoceros and rhinoceros horn, and for the hunting of rhinoceros 
for trophy hunting purposes GN 304 in GG 35248 of 10 April 2012.  
67 National Environmental Management: Biodiversity Act, 2004 (Act No. 10 of 2004): Marking of 
rhinoceros horn and hunting of rhinoceros for trophy hunting purposes GN 756 in GG 32426 of 
20 July 2009. 
68 T Milliken & J Shaw (note 32) at 38. 
69 Regulation 3(6) of the Norms and Standards for the marking of rhinoceros and rhinoceros 
horn, and for the hunting of rhinoceros for trophy hunting purposes  
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threatened or in need of national protection.70 Section 57 further provides that 
where a restricted activity involves a listed species, the person carrying out the 
activity must obtain a permit in terms of Chapter 7 of NEMBA which governs 
permitting. A restricted activity is defined under NEMBA to include the hunting, 
killing, chopping off of a specimen of a listed species, trading in a specimen of a 
listed species and exporting such a specimen from the Republic.71 In addition, 
the Minister of Environmental Affairs must monitor compliance with any 
international agreement regulating trade in specimens of endangered species 
which South Africa has ratified.72 
The TOPS Regulations are promulgated in terms of section 97 of 
NEMBA. The purpose includes further regulation of the permit system 
established in terms of Chapter 7 of NEMBA, to the extent that the system 
applies to restricted activities involving listed species, as well as the regulation 
of hunting and the prohibition of certain restricted activities. Notably, the 
amendment to these regulations make special provision for matters pertaining to 
rhinos. Regulation 24 lists prohibited activities involving Ceratotherium simum 
(White rhinoceros) and Diceros bicornis (Black rhinoceros), which provide 
added control over the limited trade allowed with respect to rhinos in the form of 
sub-regulations governing hunting and dealing in live specimens.73 The 
regulations also provide specifically for the marking of rhino horn: 
70. (1) Any person who is in possession of elephant ivory or rhinoceros horn 
must within three months of commencement of these regulations apply in 
writing to the issuing authority in the relevant province to have such elephant 
ivory or rhinoceros horn -  
(a) permitted;  
                                                          
70 s 56 of NEMBA. 
71 s 1 of NEMBA. 
72 s 59(a)(ii) of NEMBA. 
73 Prohibited activities include: the hunting of certain rhinos, the use of gin traps in hunting, and 
hunting rhinos in particular areas, or under certain conditions; the captive breeding of rhino 
without written undertaking that none of the animals will be bred, sold, supplied or exported for 
prohibited hunting activities; and the sale or purchase of live specimens without the requisite 
conditions being met. 
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(b) marked in accordance with subregulation (3); and  
(c) registered on the national database for elephant ivory and rhinoceros horn.  
... 
(3) The issuing authority, if satisfied that the possession of the elephant ivory or 
rhinoceros horn is lawful, must, at the expense of the person applying for 
marking -  
(a) mark the elephant ivory by means of punch die, or if not practicable, with 
indelible ink, using the following formula: 
(i) The country-of-origin two letter IS0 code and the last two digits of the 
particular year, followed by a forward slash;  
(ii) the serial number for the particular year, followed by a forward slash; and the 
weight of the ivory in kilograms; or  
(iii) mark the rhinoceros horn by means of a micro-chip;‘. 
b) Marking of rhino horn  
The Norms and Standards provide further guidance as to the marking of 
rhino horn by specifying the necessary contents of an application for possession 
of rhino horn. The provisions require that the horns of rhinos sold or transported, 
or horns obtained as a result of natural mortality or in any other natural manner, 
be micro-chipped.74 Paragraph 2 (4) states that an application for the 
possession of rhino horn must include information on the circumference, inner 
length and outer length of each individual detached horn, the weight of the horn, 
and a photo of the horn. The issuing authority is then responsible for conducting 
an inspection of the horn and verifying the information supplied by the 
applicant.75 The official is then expected to mark the horn with indelible ink or 
punch die as per a particular formula.76 This information is then to be kept in a 
                                                          
74 Paragraph  2(3); Application for the horn to be micro-chipped must take place within 5 days of 
acquiring said horn.  
75 Paragraph 2 (5) of the Norms and Standards.. 
76 Paragraph 2 (6) of the Norms and Standards. 
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provincial TRAFFIC database, and consolidated by the DEA in the national 
TRAFFIC database.77 DNA sampling 
DNA sampling is also governed by the Norms and Standards, which 
require that: when a live rhino is darted for any management purpose, samples 
must be taken on the animal‘s horn and blood using specialised DNA kits; and 
whenever horn is micro-chipped, horn samples must be taken.78 The samples 
may only be collected by the persons listed under paragraph 4 (3) of the Norms 
and Standards, who include a registered veterinarian responsible for darting live 
rhino and adequately trained officials from the issuing authority.The aim of 
collecting samples is to send them to send them for analysis for DNA 
profiling.79The role played by DNA profiling is to provide is to assist law 
enforcement officials in detecting, investigating and prosecuting offenders 
involved in rhinoceros poaching and trade in their horn.80 To support and 
enhance this initiative, the DEA, and the University of Pretoria‘s Veterinary 
Genetic Laboratory, in collaboration with the International Consortium on 
Combating Wildlife Crime (ICCWC), held the first international DNA sampling 
workshop. 
c) CITES Regulations 
In addition to the TOPS Regulations and the Norms and Standards, the 
DEA has also published CITES Regulations81 under NEMBA. These regulations 
define the  responsibilities of the  Management Authority and  Scientific 
Authority, the conditions of trade, specifications relating to the registration and 
marking of specimens of listed species, as well as offences and penalties to 
                                                          
77 Paragraph 2(7) of the Norms and Standards. 
78 Paragraph 4 (1),(2) of the Norms and Standards. 
79 Paragraph 4 (4) of Norms and Standards. 
80 The Department of Environmental Affairs ‗Forensics to support the fight against Wildlife 
Crime‘ (6 November 2013‘ available at 
https://www.environment.gov.za/mediarelease/forensicssupport_wildlifecrime, accessed on 5 
February 2014. 
81 National Environmental Management Biodiversity Act, Act 10 of 2004: Convention on 
International Trade in Species (CITES) Regulations GNR 173 in GG 33002 of 5 March 2010.  
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guide the domestic implementation of CITES. The international CITES trade 
regime will be explored in more detail in Chapter 3.  
d) Legal and practical measures to improve management of rhinos 
Finally, NEMBA makes provision for the development of Biodiversity 
Management Plans (BMPs) with respect to, amongst others, a listed threatened 
or protected species.82 The content of these plans is prescribed under section 
45 of NEMBA, which requires that the BMP be aimed at ensuring the long-term 
survival of the species to which it relates. The DEA recently promulgated the 
Biodiversity Management Plan for the Black Rhinoceros,83 which although not 
aimed at managing poaching activities, seeks to ensure the survival of the black 
rhino.84 
Poaching is also being addressed by way of different processes such as 
the National Rhino Management Strategy. The National Strategy for the Safety 
and Security of Rhinoceros Populations of South Africa (NSSSRPSA) outlines 
the DEA‘s rhino response strategy.85 The purpose behind the strategy is to 
provide guiding principles necessary for decision-making and planning related to 
curbing rhino poaching and to ensure the successful prosecution of those 
implicated in the illegal trade at a national, regional and international level.86 The 
NSSSRPSA is informed by NEMBA, the National Environmental Management 
Protected Areas Act87 (NEMPAA), national policy documents, relevant 
                                                          
82 s 43 of NEMBA. 
83 National Environmental Management Biodiversity Act, 2004 (Act No 10. 2004): Biodiversity 
Management Plan for the Black Rhinoceros (Diceros Bicornis) in South Africa 2011- 2020 GN 
49 in GG 36096 of 29 January 2013. 
84 ‗The Minister of Water and Environmental Affairs Gazettes the Biodiversity Management Plan 
for Black Rhino for Implementation 2013 available at 
https://www.environment.gov.za/content/minister_gazettes_biodiversitymanagementplan_blackr
hino, accessed on 20 September 2013.  
85 Department of Environmental Affairs (note 9). 
86 Department of Environmental Affairs National Strategy for the Safety and Security of 
Rhinoceros Populations in South Africa (2010) available at 
http://www.rhinoresourcecenter.com/index.php?s=1&act=pdfviewer&id=1301008151&folder=13
0, accessed on 3 December 2013.  
87 Act 57 of 2003. 
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strategies and conservation plans and international agreements ratified by 
South Africa.88 
The RIMR was commissioned for the purposes of augmenting the DEAs 
NSSSRPSA document.89 The RIMR is an amalgamation of knowledge and 
perspectives around the sustainable conservation of rhinos from several 
experts, including ecologists, rhino specialists, civil society, hunters and 
economists.90 The RIMR indicates that there is support for the legalisation of a 
commercial trade in rhino horn as a primary component of South Africa‘s 
response strategy, and that this has contributed towards Cabinet‘s decision to 
submit a rhino trade proposal for consideration at the 17th CITES Conference of 
the Parties in 2016.91 
2.2.2. Criminal Measures: Prosecutions and Penalties 
As a result of its status as a priority crime, rhino poaching features prominently 
in the National Environmental Compliance and Enforcement Report 2012/13 
(NECER).92 Firstly NECER claims that illegal hunting continues to be the most 
prevalent environmental crime within the so-called ―green‖ sub-sector.93 The 
Report reflects that SANPARKS reported 454 incidents of illegal hunting of rhino 
in a national park, its most prevalent crime. Similarly, the Mpumalanga Tourism 
and Parks Agency points to illegal hunting of rhino as its most prevalent crime, 
with 27 reported incidents.94 
Chapter 9 of the NECER, which relates to biodiversity enforcement and 
compliance, is largely focused around criminal enforcement related to rhinos.95 
                                                          
88 Department of Environmental Affairs (note 86). 
89 Department of Environmental Affairs (note 9) at vii. 
90 Department of Environmental Affairs (note 9). 
91 Ibid. 
92 Department of Environmental Affairs National Environmental Compliance and Enforcement 
Report 2012/13 (2013) Chief Directorate of Communications, Department of Environmental 
Affairs, Pretoria, South Africa. 
93 Ibid at 10; NECER 2012/13 utilises ‗green‘ to denote compliance and enforcement activities 
taking place in the biodiversity and protected areas sub-sector. 
94 Ibid at 11. 
95 Ibid at 56. 
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It further acknowledges that proper investigation, prosecution and conviction of 
those arrested in connection with poaching, and the imposition of an appropriate 
penalty, are crucial in order for these measures to provide an effective deterrent 
to poaching. NECER reports a total of 333 rhinos poached in 2010, 448 rhinos 
in 2011, and 668 rhinos in 2012, across South Africa‘s provinces and national 
parks.96 In contrast the Report provides that a total of 165 arrests were made in 
connection with rhino poaching in 2012, with 232 arrests in 2011, and 267 in 
2012. It is evident that while the poaching statistics have more than doubled 
over two years, the number of arrests has not increased proportionately.97 In 
addition it is notable that the majority of the losses to the rhino population were 
sustained in the Kruger National Park.98 
However, of these arrests, NECER reflects only 95 accused involved in 
50 finalised cases related to rhino poaching prosecutions in the period April 
2012 to April 2013.99 These cases demonstrate a positive number of 
convictions, which constitute 72.6% of the accused involved and of these, 36 
accused were convicted and sentenced to direct imprisonment without the 
option of a fine.100 On the other hand 24.2% of accused escaped prosecution 
due to the case being withdrawn, and another 21% were convicted and 
sentenced to a fine.101 With respect to those convicted, the majority of the 
charges related to trespassing, the illegal possession of firearms of ammunition 
and illegal hunting.102 Fewer accused were actually successfully charged with 
the possession of horn, and a very small contingent was convicted for dealing in 
rhino horn.103 These statistics illustrate one of the key concerns in the 
enforcement approach to addressing poaching, that is, that it primarily targets 
the poachers and not the middle-man. The implication being that trade is not cut 
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off at the point of supply because poachers can readily be replaced by said 
middle-man.   
Furthermore, NECER details a list of criminal cases with respect to rhino 
poaching that have seen ‗significant sentences‘ handed down, largely by 
regional courts, on the basis of both common law and legislative offences.104 
These cases are of particular interest because they demonstrate the punitive 
approach of the courts to rhino poaching crime, evidenced by the imposition of 
heavy penalties. The results of the cases also suggest the willingness of the 
state to prosecute these offences seriously. For example, conviction on the 
basis of illegal hunting and the possession of firearms and ammunition sees the 
imposition of a 5 year prison sentence (even where no rhino was yet killed).105 
Another case involved two Mozambican nationals who were found guilty of 
illegally hunting 2 rhinos, trespassing in the Kruger National Park, and unlawful 
possession of firearms and ammunition.106 The Nelspruit Regional Court 
sentenced both accused to 29 years imprisonment.107 
The most striking case is that of S v Chumlong Lemtongthai and five 
others108. Chumlong Lemtongthai is a Thai national sentenced to 40 years direct 
imprisonment upon pleading guilty to 52 counts of contravention of South 
African legislation.109 NECER reports as follows: 
‗[Chumlong Lemtongthai] was alleged to have been trading in and exporting 
rhino horns from South Africa, which were then sold to the underground 
traditional medicine market in Asia. He was using prostitutes to pose as hunters 
in order to smuggle the horns out of the country, and was believed to be one of 
the kingpins of an international rhino horn smuggling syndicate.‘110 
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The accused was charged with 26 counts of contravening section 80 
(1)(i) of the Customs and Excise Act.111 The latter provides that where someone 
makes improper use of a licence, permit or other document issued in respect of 
goods to which the Act relates, that person shall be guilty of an offence.112 The 
act prescribes the penalty of a fine of no more than R20 000 or imprisonment for 
no more than five years, or both, for the contravention of the aforementioned 
provision.113 A further charges were brought in terms of section 57(1) of 
NEMBA, which prohibits the carrying out of a restricted activity involving a 
specimen of a listed threatened or protected species, on the basis that 
Chumlong ‗unlawfully and intentionally traded rhino horn, a listed threatened or 
protected species, without the necessary TOPS permits to either trade in such 
horns or hunt and/or kill or export the rhino horns.‘114 NEMBA in turn prescribes 
a penalty of 10 years imprisonment, and/or a fine of R 10 million.115 
The decision of the court a quo was successfully taken on appeal on the 
basis that the Magistrate had misdirected himself in imposing a sentence of 40 
years as the Customs and Excise act allows 5 years imprisonment for the 
relevant charges where the Magistrate had imposed 10 years.116 In deciding 
what an appropriate, just and fair sentence would be in the appeal court, Tsoka 
J, acknowledged the public outcry for the imposition of harsher sentences for 
rhino crimes in the wake of the increase in poaching since 2010, and asserted 
that public opinion should be considered in determining what constitutes an 
appropriate sentence.117 The judge insists that ‗deterrence cries out in this 
matter‘ and that sentencing in this case should serve as a deterrent to all 
perpetrators of rhino crimes and act so as to dissuade potential poachers.118  In 
                                                          
111 Act 91 of 1964. 
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 Chumlong v S (A82/2013) [2013] ZAGPTHC 294 (30 August 2013) at para 2. 
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light of these considerations, and the personal circumstances of the appellant, 
the court ultimately imposed a sentence of 30 years direct imprisonment. 119 
The judgement of Chumlong v S demonstrates the sensitivity of the court 
to public concern around the rhino poaching crisis and the demand for greater 
enforcement and more stringent penalties as a means of counteracting this 
crisis. The case also exemplifies the theory behind actively pursuing criminal 
prosecution and imposing heavy sentences, which is to deter other potential 
criminals from undertaking similar illegal activities through increasing the risk 
involved. However, while the numbers of rhino poached are rising rapidly, this 
trend is not adequately reflected in the number of arrests for rhino-related 
offences. What is more, one should bear in mind that of 232 arrests in 2011, 
and 267 arrests in 2012, only 95 accused were involved in finalised cases, and 
only 69 thereof were convicted. There disparity perhaps evidences the difficulty 
in connecting suspects to particular wildlife crimes. Moreover, despite the 
measures being taken, and the attitude of the courts, NECER declares that ‗the 
spectre of rhino poaching continues unabated in the 2012/13 financial year‘. 
2.2.3. Other practical measures 
a) Anti-poaching activities and rhino-security 
In addition to the steps taken to address the legislative loopholes that 
became apparent due to the abuse of trophy hunting, as mentioned above, 
South Africa has taken several practical steps towards curbing poaching within 
its borders. Notably; the South African government has increased state funding 
available for anti-poaching activities and activities related to rhino-security.120 
Other steps include the establishment of the National Biodiversity Investigator‘s 
Forum in March of 2009, and the launch of the National Wildlife Crime Reaction 
                                                          
119 Ibid 33-4. 
120 S Ferreira & B Okita-Ouma ‗A proposed framework for short-, medium- and long-term 
responses by range states to curb poaching for African rhino horns‘ 2012 Pachyderm No. 51 
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Unit (NWRCU)in early/late February 2010.121 The latter was considered 
beneficial as it would encourage the exchange of information and cooperation 
between government bodies operating at provincial and national levels.122 
Due to the nature of the poaching threat in the Kruger National Park in 
particular, the South African Police Services (SAPS), the South African National 
Defence Force (SANDF), and South African National Parks (SANParks) have 
coordinated their responses in that area,123 while the South African Police 
Service (SAPS) has also appointed a team of the SAPS Directorate of Priority 
Crime Investigation (SAPS DPCI) centred around rhino poaching activities at a 
national level.124 Further the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) has 
designated particular prosecutors for the purpose of dealing with organised 
environmental crime at a national and provincial level.125 
b) Dehorning 
 
Yet another practical measure considered for the purpose of deterring 
poaching is the dehorning of rhino. In 2011 the DEA commissioned a study on 
the utility of dehorning as a tool for undermining poaching efforts.126 This study 
considered the current insights into the effectiveness of dehorning, and raises a 
number of concerns which remain relevant to the present situation. 
One of the said concerns was the reluctance of the private sector to 
release information about its rhino populations, either due to the potential risk 
posed to security, or because the horn was removed illegally.127 The alleged 
reasons for illegal dehorning are that either the horn was removed for sale on 
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https://www.environment.gov.za/sites/default/files/docs/studyon_dehorning_african_rhinoceros.p
df, accessed on 5 February 2014. 
127Ibid at 45. 
25 
 
the black market, or because the landholder does not want to inform nature 
conservation authorities.128 As the dehorning of rhino involves the cutting or 
chopping off of parts of a threatened or protected species, it constitutes a 
restricted activity,129 and in terms of s 57 (1) of NEMBA, is thus subject to 
permitting as per Chapter 7 of this Act and the TOPS Regulations. As discussed 
above, the Norms and Standards set out the requirements for an application for 
possession of a rhino horn, and provide that all ‗individual detached rhino horns 
in private or state possession must be micro-chipped in accordance with 
Regulation 70 of the TOPS Regulations.‘130 The concomitant risks include 
leakage as to the whereabouts of horns, and costly delays in the permitting 
system.131 Another concern is that there have been reports of dehorned rhino 
being poached for their stumps.132 Due to the price of horn, and the fact that the 
base could weigh up to a kilogram, the stump may still carry a value to 
poachers.133 In addition, poachers have been known to kill a dehorned rhino to 
ensure that they do not track the animal again.134 
Dehorning is both logistically challenging and financially burdensome, 
and would have to be repeated every two to three years in light of the growth 
rate of the horns.135 In addition the behavioural and social impacts of dehorning 
are uncertain, for example, some studies indicate that calves are less likely to 
survive in areas populated with hyenas and lions where the mothers have been 
dehorned.136 These considerations, in combination with the desirability of the 
horn stump, suggest that dehorning should only be utilised in time of sever 
poaching stress, and must be used in concert with security measures.137 
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c) Poisoning of horn 
Treating rhino horn with a poison so as to make it less desirable to 
poachers and consumers has been raised by stakeholders.138 A combination of 
3 substances is typically injected: The first is a dye which stains the interior of 
the horn which makes it less appropriate for decorative purpose; the second is a 
substance which makes the horn detectable under x-ray and thus harder to 
transport; and the third is a poison.139 The poison is harmful but non-lethal to 
humans and symptoms include vomiting, diarrhoea, nerve disorders and other 
dose-related health problems.140 The rhinos‘ health is not affected because 
there are no veins in the animals‘ horns.141 
The legal ramifications of poisoning have been brought into question as 
consumers may have recourse if poisoned in this manner even if they obtained 
the horn illegally.142 That said, any harm suffered as a result of poisoning that 
occurred outside of South African borders could not be brought before South 
African courts.143 Thus, prosecution of South Africans who have so poisoned 
rhino horns would be subject to extradition requirements.144 
The effectiveness of this measure has not been confirmed. The pilot 
program started in the latter half of 2013 at the Ezemvelo Wildlife Park and if 
successful, will spread to other parks.145 
d) The South African dilemma: poaching persists 
It is important to note that despite the legal framework in place, the 
tightening of the regulation of the hunting industry, and the steps taken to 
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improve the management and protection of the rhino, the poaching continues to 
escalate with numbers nearly doubling annually.146 It is clear from the 
discussion above that South Africa is attempting multiple approaches to 
addressing the increase in poaching, including more stringent enforcement and 
the imposition of heavy penalties in an attempt to deter transgressions. However 
the effect of these measure, whether legal, regulatory, criminal or practical, have 
not proven to offer a large enough degree of resistance against poaching to 
have any significant impact, even when used in combination. It is evident from 
the declaration of rhino poaching as a priority crime that it is considered a crisis, 
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Horns‘ 1 March 2013 Science Vol 339 No 6123 pp1038-1039 at 1038 available at 
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South Africa to the 16th Conference of Parties of the Convention in International Trade in 
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CHAPTER 3 - THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
1. Introduction 
There are numerous international organisations, networks and agreements that 
monitor, control and study the wildlife trade, both illicit and legal. It is the 
application of these international instruments that influence domestic legislative 
and policy development, and impose obligations at a national level with regards 
to addressing the illegal rhino horn trade. The focus of this chapter will naturally 
fall on CITES, as the instrument in terms of which the trade ban was adopted. 
2. CITES and the trade ban  
2.1.  Background 
CITES is the primary international instrument regulating international trade in 
certain listed species of wild animal so as to ensure that said trade does not 
threaten their survival.148 This agreement was entered into force in 1975, 
initiated by the General Assembly of the World Conservation Union (IUCN), and 
is legally binding on those who have ratified it, including South Africa.149 CITES 
specifies which species may be traded and to what degree, and its members 
are expected to adhere to the restrictions, prohibitions and regulatory 
requirements imposed on trade by the agreement, its appendices, as well as 
                                                          
148 Department of Environmental Affairs (note 9); PW Birnie and AE Boyle International Law and 
the Environment Second Edition 2002 Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK at 625; P Sands et al 
Principles of International Environmental law (2012) Cambridge University Press, UK at 472. 
There are several other bodies and regional instruments relevant to the efforts to conserve 
rhino, and monitor and control trade in rhino products. These include the following:  African 
Rhino Specialist Group (AfRSG) of the World Conservation Union Species Specialist 
Commission (IUCN/SSC) which constitutes the international framework for the conservation of 
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149 Ibid; T Milliken & J Shaw (note 32) at 44; CITES ‗What is CITES?‘, available at 
http://www.cites.org/eng/disc/what.php, accessed on 17 January 2014; U Beyerlin and T 
Marauhn International Environmental Law 2011 Hart Publishing Ltd, Oxford, UK at 184; S Lyster 
International Wildlife Law (1985) Grotius Publications, Cambridge, UK at 239. 
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resolutions adopted at any Conference of the Parties (CoP). Therefore CITES is 
responsible for the present international trade ban with respect to rhinos and 
rhino products, and any proposal to legalise trade would require approval 
thereunder. 150 
CITES provides framework for which is then translated into domestic 
legislation so as to ensure implementation at a national level.151This is evident in 
the structure and operation of NEMBA and the TOPS Regulations. 
2.2. The operation of CITES 
CITES operates so as to regulate international trade in the species listed in the 
Appendices to CITES through a permitting system that governs import and 
export.152 Thus CITES requires government-authorised permits for any trade 
involving species or the products of species that are endangered or 
threatened.153 The purpose of permitting is to provide a system for the control 
and monitoring of trade in wildlife across the borders of member states.154 The 
implication is that the successful application of CITES relies on the efficacy of 
the permit system, competent domestic legislation and law enforcement.155 
Carey points out that it is evident from the CITES preamble that the 
purpose of this instrument is to ‗strike a balance between species preservation 
and the competing economic and recreational demands placed upon wildlife.‘156 
The Convention thereby gives effect to both the conservationist and 
preservationist ideologies.157 This balance is reflected throughout the 
                                                          
150 Trade ban is currently subject to white rhino which are partially listed under Appendix II, 
allowing for restricted trade in live rhino and hunting trophies.  
151 Department of Environmental Affairs (note 9). 
152 Ibid; J Glazewski Environmental Law in South Africa Second Edition (2005) Lexis Nexus, 
Durban, South Africa at 50. 
153 CITES (note 3) at article II (4). 
154 S Patal ‗Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species: Enforcement and the last 
unicorn‘ 1995-6 16 Hous. J. Int’l L. 157 at 164. 
155 Ibid; Ibid at 163. 
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Convention as it provides for the protection of species, and thus the restriction 
of trade, proportional to the risk posed to the sustainability of the species.158 
This is achieved by listing species in a hierarchy of appendices, classified 
according to their vulnerability to extinction.159 
Species are divided amongst the first three appendices. Appendix I lists 
species that are ‗threatened with extinction which are or may be affected by 
trade‘.160 CITES requires that trade in these species be severely restricted.161 
Article III of CITES essentially prohibits commercial trade in Appendix I species 
and their products, and prescribes a strict permitting regime where both the 
importing and exporting country require permits for specific transactions.162 This 
Appendix thus advocates the preservationist approach in that it propounds the 
idea that the eradication of trade will eliminate it as one of the key threats to the 
species survival.163 
Appendix II lists threatened species for which the strict regulation of trade 
is considered necessary so as to guard against utilisation that threatens their 
sustainability.164 This Appendix seeks to advance the conservationist theory in 
that it allows for a sustainable level of commercial trade in species which have 
the potential to face the threat of extinction.165 CITES requires that export 
permits accompany trade in Appendix II listed species, and that the export 
permits be monitored and managed by the state‘s Scientific Authority and 
Management Authority, respectively.166 
  
                                                                                                                                                                          
the role of individual nations cooperating with the international community, and advocates for 
sustainable use trade as the most effect means of species protection.  
158 S Patal (Note 154) at 164. 
159 Ibid at 165; CITES (Note 3) at article II. 
160 CITES (note 3) at article II paragraph 1. 
161 Ibid. 
162J E Carey (note 156) at 1295; A J Heimert ‗How the elephant lost his tusks‘ 1995-6 104 Yale 
L.J. 1473 at 1476. 
163 J E Carey (note 156) at 1295 
164 Article II paragraph 2. 
165 J E Carey (note 156) at 1295. 
166 Article IV of CITES. 
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2.3. CITES decisions related to rhinos 
CITES was ratified by South Africa on 13 October 1975 as only the 15thparty to 
sign the convention.167 In 1977 in the midst of the rhino poaching crisis of the 
1970s, all rhinos were place on CITES Appendix I – thereby prohibiting all 
international commercial trade in rhinos.168 Only in 1994 at CITES CoP9 did 
South Africa succeed in obtaining the partial down-listing of white rhino to 
Appendix II so that while trade remained restricted, it was authorised with 
respect to trading in live animals and for the export of legal hunting trophies.169 
At the same time CoP9 saw the introduction of Resolution 9.14 on Conservation 
of rhinoceros in South Africa170 which encouraged parties to the Convention to, 
amongst others: develop a recovery plan for their rhino population; to implement 
adequate legislation and internal trade restrictions; reduce illegal trade and 
increase law enforcement cooperation to curtail trafficking in rhino horn.171 This 
resolution also incorporated a previous resolution authorising legal sport hunting 
with respect to Appendix I species as non-commercial trade, where such a trade 
would be beneficial to the species in question.172 
The emergence of the rhino horn trade in South Africa, including those 
legally acquired and subsequently laundered into the illegal trade, was brought 
to attention at the CITES CoP14 by TRAFFIC.173 At the following meeting, 
CoP15 in 2010, the TRAFFIC/IUCN Report ―on the national and continental 
conservation status of African and Asian rhinoceros species, trade in specimens 
of rhinoceros, stocks management, incidents of illegal killing of rhinoceroses, 
enforcement issues, and conservation  management strategies, with an 
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evaluation of their effectiveness‘,174 as mandated by Resolution 9.14, was 
presented.175 This report highlighted the escalation of poaching and the 
concomitant trade in rhino horn, with South Africa and Zimbabwe identified as 
the primary source countries and Vietnam as the key consumer country.176 
The CITES CoP16, which took place in Bangkok in 2013, saw the 
submission of the follow-up report from TRAFFIC/IUCN on the status, 
conservation and trade of African and Asian rhinoceroses177 which indicates 
trends since the CoP15 Report and fulfils the mandate of Resolution 9.14. The 
CoP16 further saw CITES call on Vietnam to develop legislation relating to the 
domestic imports of hunting trophies and a database for the tracking of these 
trophies, and to make progress in developing and implementing the South 
Africa- Vietnam 2012-2017 Joint Action Plan, and to improve prosecution and 
investigation of Vietnamese nationals suspected of involvement in the illegal 
rhino horn trade.178 
3. The amendment of the CITES Appendices 
3.1. Requirements for amending the CITES Appendices 
As mentioned above, it is CITES that is responsible for the control and 
monitoring of international trade in species, and thus the trade in rhino horn. 
Article XV of CITES governs the procedure for amendments to Appendices I 
and II, and requires that any proposal for the downlisting of rhino to Appendix II, 
which would allow for the legalisation of trade, has to be made to CITES.  
CITES provides that any party may bring a proposal for the amendment 
of these appendices 150 days before the next Conference of the Parties (CoP), 
after which the Secretariat will consult with the other parties to the Convention 
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and other interested bodies.179 The adoption of the amendment requires a two-
thirds majority vote of the parties that are present at the CoP and voting (that is, 
not abstaining from the vote), and if successful, enters into operation 90 days 
after this meeting subject to any reservations adopted.180 
Provision is also made for amendments proposed by parties between 
CoPs, for which it prescribes postal procedures. In this instance the Secretariat 
is obliged to immediately convey the proposal to the other parties.181 In the 
event that the recommendations made by other parties and CITES in response 
to the proposal receive no objection, the amendment will enter into force 90 
days later.182 Where there has been objection, the proposal will be subjected to 
a vote where a two-thirds majority is required for acceptance.183 
While the procedural requirements for bringing a proposal to lift a trade 
ban are clear, the contents of said proposal remain largely unprescribed. The 
listing process has become more scientific and objective with the introduction of 
the ‗Fort Lauderdale Criteria‘ at the 1994 CoP, which established numerical 
standards for the listing of species and acts as a guide in the addition and 
removal of species from Appendices I and II.184 These criteria were 
subsequently replaced by the ‗Bangkok criteria‘ at the 12th CoP in 2004185. 
3.2. Amendment to the listing of rhino 
Considering that the Black Rhinoceros is currently classified as being critically 
endangered by virtue of the fact that the population is an estimated 5055 in 
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2012, it is improbable that down listing will be authorised so as to allow for trade 
in black rhino products.186 White rhinos on the other hand are classified as near 
threatened.187 White rhino populations currently remain sustainable, although 
they are at risk of decline if poaching drives the death rate to exceed the birth 
rate. The population reflected 20 170 by 2011.188 Therefore any trade proposal 
will likely be aimed at removing the trade ban with respect to white rhino. 
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 CHAPTER 4 - THE DEBATE AS TO THE LEGALISATION OF TRADE 
AND THE WAY FORWARD  
1. Introduction 
In light of the current poaching crisis several different methods have been 
implemented and dozens of solutions considered to combat illegal rhino horn 
trade. The most contentious suggestion, however, has been the legalisation of 
trade in rhino and its products. The DEA has openly expressed its interest in 
submitting a proposal to CITES for the lifting of the trade ban with respect to 
rhinos at CoP17 in 2016. This indicates that the government has been 
persuaded by arguments in favour of legalised trade as a solution to the 
apparently indefatigable rate of poaching in South Africa. This chapter seeks to 
identify the primary schools of thought, and key arguments made, with respect 
to the viability of the legalisation of the rhino horn. Exploration and analysis of 
these arguments and theories will assist in determining whether, and to what 
extent, the legalisation of trade is a suitable option in the context of the current 
rhino horn crisis. 
2. Theories pro-legalisation of trade 
2.1. Price-inelasticity  
Micheal t‘Sas Rolfes maintains that there are two characteristics with regards to 
the rhino horn market that are of particular concern: the market size and price 
inelasticity.189 The market size refers to the value of the market, and thus the 
threat posed to the endangered species, which, in the case of rhino horn, may 
be inversely proportional to the quantity being moved.190 Price-inelasticity refers 
to the evident immunity the demand in rhino horn displays to increases in price, 
meaning that consumers are either unable or unwilling to accept 
substitutes.191T‘Sas Rolfes suggests that there are three reasons why the 
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demand for rhino may be inelastic: rhino horn is administered in small doses, 
meaning that the cost to traditional healers is spread out over a number of 
consumers; it is often used in cases of serious illness where the user is 
desperate and thus insensitive to price; and where bought as a symbol of 
status, the consumer is invariably in possession of a high disposable income.192 
 
Figure 1 – Inelasticity of demand193 
The above graphic seeks to illustrate the concept of price-inelasticity. A 
demand curve shows what quantities of a good would be demanded by the 
market at various price levels. If one were to compare two demand curves, as in 
Figure 1, the demand curve 2 (D2) is more inelastic than Demand curve 1 (D1). 
What this entails is that a large increase in price for D2results in a smaller 
decrease in quantity than the same increase in price would cause with respect 
to D1. The demand for rhino horn has been shown to be inelastic in this nature 
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as mentioned above. Thus the inelastic nature of the demand means that 
increasing the cost of poaching (via anti-poaching measures) and thus the price 
of rhino horn would have a limited effect on the quantity demanded.  
2.2. Demand and supply 
The central argument in support of the legalisation of trade is based on the 
theory that the availability of a legal supply, provided either by stockpiled horn or 
legal dehorning or harvesting, will cause black market prices to decline and 
remove the incentive behind supplying this market.194 Collins et al suggest that 
there are two main uses of rhino horn: on the one hand rhino horn is used in 
Traditional Chinese Medicine (TCM) to treat ailments ranging from life 
threatening illnesses to colds and fevers, in this respect practitioners of 
traditional medicine and some individual users of horn have an interest in 
maintaining a constant supply; on the other hand it is purchased as a status gift 
and/or ‗speculative asset‘ which increases in value with the increased scarcity 
of, or difficulty in obtaining, the product195 The reasoning is thus, lower prices 
would in turn reduce the incentive behind the illegal trade, which is currently 
driving the actions of organised crime syndicates, and thus remove the incentive 
behind poaching.196 Put differently, it is proposed that the demand-supply ratio 
with respect to rhino horn increases as a result of the suppression of supply, 
leading to an increase in prices, which in turn provides larger incentives for 
poaching.197 Thus there are two possible responses, either one attempts to 
suppress the demand or one enhances supply to meet demand.198 
One of the primary arguments advanced in opposition to the above 
reasoning is that the lowering of market prices associated with the legalisation 
of trade will mean that the product is available to more consumers, and thus 
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demand will be stimulated.199 The result would be that demand grows and again 
outweighs supply which will create space for an illegal market fuelled by 
poaching.200 Ironically, because of the trade ban, very little data is available as 
to the size and nature of the rhino horn markets.201 In addition, Boddham-
Whetham points out that neither the impact of once-off sales nor trade has yet 
been ascertained.202 It is further asserted that demand cannot be regulated, and 
thus the illegal market will continue to rely on poaching to supply the needs of 
new consumers now capable of meeting the lowered prices.203 
A response to this argument is that while this outcome is not impossible, 
it remains unlikely because in order for poaching to increase following the lifting 
of the trade ban, there would need to be ‗a dramatic outward shift of the demand 
curve and/or a far more competitive cost function.‘204 The demand curve would 
shift in this way, in the short-term, if previously law-abiding citizens become 
consumers under the legal market.205 However, these consumers tend to be 
more price-sensitive and are thus less likely to increase prices.206  Long-term 
factors that would spur demand would include the rising growth of the Asian 
market due to increasing incomes and aggressive marketing of rhino horn 
products.207 T‘Sas Rolfes argues that the growth of the market will occur 
irrespective of the legality of the market, and the latter is easier to address in a 
legal market than an illegal one.208 The ideal course of action would involve the 
simultaneous increase of supply and the reduction in demand, however the 
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efficacy of demand reduction strategies is brought into question, as discussed 
below. 
Of course whether the lowering of prices is immediately possible is also 
open to question because of the potential costs involved in implementing 
captive breeding programmes (CBPs) for the purpose of harvesting enough 
rhino horn to influence the market. A key concern is the cost of security for 
these CBPs as they call for large tracts of land, and are vulnerable to poaching 
by the syndicates whose income and market power they threaten.209 Collins et al 
suggest that because CBP is so costly, it would necessitate the arrangement of 
subsidies or soft-loans for the provision of security so as to allow for sufficient 
time within which to build up a sustainable herd of appropriate proportions to 
enter the market for horn.210 It is, however, arguable that the proceeds from the 
sale of rhino horn and trophy hunting could be ploughed back immediately into 
reinforcing security measures. Theoretically this would mean that as rhino 
breeding facilities are being established, anti-poaching measures will be 
enhanced accordingly. This provides an attractive option for private landowners, 
provided that the system for the return of proceeds from rhino horn sales to 
conservation measures is regulated within the appropriate framework. 
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Figure 2 – Market forces in the rhino horn market  
The graph above illustrates the concept of supply and demand, and how 
they may be affected by different methods of influencing either supply or 
demand (excluding trade). S1 is the supply curve for the rhino horn market. It 
represents the various quantities that suppliers (including poachers) are willing 
to supply at various price levels. The point at which D1 and S1 intersect is called 
the equilibrium price. This is the point where quantity supplied equals quantity 
demanded and establishes an equilibrium market price.211 
The inevitable growth in both income and population of the consumer 
market for this good will shift the demand curve from D1 to DIncome and then 
DPopulation. This causes the equilibrium price to rise to the new intersection point 
of the demand curve and the supply curve leading to a higher market price and 
quantity. In essence what is happening is that given that the supply side stays 
the same, increased demand has pushed up the market price so that suppliers 
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can fetch higher prices and are thus incentivised to sell larger quantities. This 
translates into increased incentive to poach rhino to supply the illegal trade. 
As suggested above, this can be combatted using demand reduction 
strategies to shift the demand curve left to DDem-reduct. Finally, poaching 
measures can be put in place that would increase the cost of poaching which 
would shift the supply curve left to SAnti-P which would increase the equilibrium 
price but lower the equilibrium quantity. 
2.3. ‘Sustainable use approach’  
The abovementioned argument which suggests that the proceeds of rhino horn 
be fed back into the protection and farming of the rhino, is related to what has 
been termed the ‗sustainable use approach‘. This approach essentially 
advocates the use of wildlife to the benefit of the landowner supporting it.212 The 
four key concepts that constitute this approach are proprietorship, price, 
subsidiary and collaborative adaptive management.213 Of particular relevance is 
the price-proprietorship hypothesis which claims that ‗if wildlife is valuable, and if 
this value accrues to landholders, then there is a high probability that 
landholders will manage wildlife sustainably, just as they would manage 
livestock.‘214 
Hence the theory is that income generated as a result of the sale of rhino 
horn could act as an incentive for private and State stakeholders to retain rhinos 
and encourage their growth in numbers and range.215 This is a valuable 
consideration as there is a current fear that without the legalisation of trade, 
private owners will be disinclined to keep rhinos on their properties.216 The 
rationale being that the benefits of increased income from legal Rhino horn 
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sales would offset the costs of anti-poaching and intelligence-gathering 
activities.217 
This approach is increasingly attractive in light of the inability of the State 
to provide financial assistance, and the absence of international funding 
sources, as the burden of security costs is then largely placed on the shoulders 
of rhino owners and custodians.218  Diminished government funding for 
conservation combined with the increased cost of conservation mean that the 
requisite levels of field management and protection for rhinos will be difficult, if 
indeed possible, to maintain.219 
Rhino farming would thus provide a process whereby private rhino 
owners can harvest horn to be sold on a legalised market.220 It could potentially 
also pose an opportunity for community participation through partnerships 
between the private sector and/or the State, and communities living within and 
near reserves or parks.221 While this encourages ‗sustainable economic 
empowerment‘, it also has the added benefit of reducing the susceptibility of 
impoverished local communities to recruitment into the poaching system.222 
South Africa echoed this sentiment at the CoP16 conference stating that a zero 
quota trade ban on hunting trophies for a list of specimens (including white 
rhino) as proposed by Kenya would impoverish bona fide hunting and 
associated revenues.223 
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3. Theories against legalisation 
3.1. Laundering of rhino horn 
Another key argument against the legalisation of trade is that it will simply result 
in the laundering of illegal horn into the legal market. Several examples are 
available of trade in wildlife where legal trade has existed parallel to, and has 
been undermined by, illegal trade.224 In light of the lack of enforcement 
demonstrated by Vietnam there is scepticism as to whether user countries 
possess the requisite political will and oversight capacity so as to adequately 
oversee and monitor trade in such a way as to avoid laundering of horn.225This 
lack of political will is further evidenced by China‘s statement at a CoP16 
conference where China acknowledged the need for international cooperation 
but noted that the ultimate responsibility for conservation lies with the range 
countries.226 
T‘Sas Rolfes states that while legalised trade may reduce the transaction 
costs of illegal trading, it will also reduce its profit margins. Thus a legal trading 
mechanism could discourage rather than encourage illegal trade if designed 
properly.227 He has also suggested that that the laundering of illegal horns may 
be mitigated by measures including DNA fingerprinting which would allow for 
differentiation between legal and illegal horn at different points in the legal 
trade.228 One could, however, counter that the implementation of this kind of 
technology raises concerns in and of itself, including how the DNA analysis 
would be funded, enforced and monitored.229 
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3.2. Demand Reduction 
Demand reduction strategies are premised on the idea that through education 
and campaigning the demand for rhino horn can be reduced, if not eradicated. 
This would cause the disparity between supply and demand, caused by the 
trade ban, to be narrowed. The demand reduction approach is thus cited by 
opponents of the legalisation of trade who maintain that public education 
supplies a powerful mechanism for long-term protection of endangered 
species.230 The reasoning is that ‗education addresses the central and most 
influential cause of species endangerment: the consuming market and its 
control over wildlife.‘231 
This strategy may not be sufficient in that: it assumes that rhino horn has 
no medicinal value as maintained by Western medicine and that this will be 
accepted by those that subscribe to TCM practices, whereas the latter has been 
accepted for centuries in Eastern culture; and general campaigns might not 
have the desired effect on the actual consumers that are prepared to pay the 
high prices for rhino horn due to an entrenched belief in its medicinal value 
and/or its status-value in defiance of Western culture.232 The last point aligns 
with the theory expressed before that rhino horn is often obtained as a status 
gift or speculative asset retained for its potential scarcity and its increasing 
value. Some critics contend that awareness and education efforts have thus far 
failed to impact the present demand, and are thus insufficient as a solution to 
the poaching trend, even when combined with other anti-poaching methods 
such as increased enforcement.233 
While it would be ideal to combine demand reduction with the legalisation 
of trade so as to bring supply and demand to equilibrium, this may not be 
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possible as the two strategies do not operate together comfortably. Due to the 
fact that in most consumer countries trade in rhino horn is banned, the 
legalisation of trade would require the lifting of these bans and appropriate 
changes to domestic legislation.234 If one is simultaneously attempting to 
educate consumers as to the properties of rhino horn and legalising trade, the 
message sent to consumers is mixed.235 However, this does not preclude 
education as to the plight of the rhino in range states and the operation of the 
system of supply, which could encourage consumers to use horn sourced by 
legal rather than illegal means.  
3.3. Enforcement measures  
Another suggestion is that in lieu of a legal trade, poaching would be better 
addressed by way of increased enforcement measures. These include heavier 
sentencing and improved prosecution of those who are arrested in connection 
with suspected rhino poaching activities, and other methods such as dehorning, 
poisoning of horn, anti-poaching patrols, and the use of drones and helicopters. 
While all of these measures are being implemented, or at least considered, in 
South Africa, it does not appear that any are succeeding in stemming the tide of 
poaching incidents.  
All the field-protection measures mentioned above are costly, and the 
cost is most often borne by rhino owners and managers on an on-going 
basis.236 However, these steps to increase security, combined with public 
awareness and fundraising campaigns, have not had a deterrent effect in 
relation to poaching in private and public parks.237  In fact dehorning, without 
any concomitant anti-poaching measures, has ceased to be effective due to the 
extreme prices for horn which mean that even the stump is highly valuable.238 
Due to the rate at which rhino horn grows, dehorning has to be undertaken 
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regularly which is an additional expense.239 Obtaining the permit that is required 
for the removal of horn is often considered to be a burdensome and lengthy 
process, which is also constitutes a potential liability due to the fact that it 
involves revealing the whereabouts of rhinos.240 
In relation to the arrests made, these are most often arrests of on-the-
ground-poachers, or movers of horn, not leaders of syndicates, and prosecution 
is usually slow, while the courts remain hesitant to impose heavy penalties. 241 
4. Case studies: elephant and vicuña  
In evaluating whether or not a legalised trade is appropriate with respect to rhino 
horn, it is instructive to consider comparable wildlife trades.242 There are a 
number of species which may be suited to this purpose, however this paper will 
limit its scope to the vicuña and the African Elephant. The present enquiry will 
consider the vicuña as it has been suggested that the case of the vicuña is 
directly comparable to that of the rhino, and furthermore it is considered to be an 
example of the successful recovery of a species nearing extinction and 
implementation of a legal trade.243 The second case study will consider the 
African Elephant as they are suffering prosecution for their ivory similar to that of 
rhino for their horn, and the ivory trade has a long history. In addition the African 
Elephant case study will serve as a precursor to the analysis of the proposed 
model for trade in African Elephant ivory in the chapter that follows. 
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The vicuña is a South American animal, much like a llama, which is 
sought after for its wool.244 Vicuña populations plummeted due to exploitation so 
that by the 1960s they were threatened with extinction, with a reported low of 
6000 animals surviving in 1965.245 In response to this crisis Argentina, Bolivia, 
Chile, Peru and Ecuador signed the Convention for the Conservation of Vicuña 
in La Paz in 1969 (the La Paz Agreement).246 This agreement calls upon 
member states to prohibit and repress any hunting of vicuña or trade in their 
products, or articles made from these products, at a domestic and an 
international level.247The idea behind the La Paz Agreement was to give vicuña 
a chance to recover in the hope that this would eventually allow for the live 
capture and shearing of these animals for their wool.248In addition vicuña were 
listed under Appendix I to CITES in 1975 due to the fact that the population 
faced extinction.249 
Following the implementation of the Vicuña Convention and CITES 
listing, populations rose to about 343 500 by 2007.250 As a result a number of 
vicuña populations have been downlisted to CITES Appendix II, thereby 
authorising trade in wool from live-shorn populations and derived products 
subject to strict regulation.251 Populations subject to Appendix II include those of 
Bolivia and Peru, as well as certain populations win Argentina and Chile.252The 
amended listings are reflective of an international policy shift from strict 
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preservation to sustainable use.253 Thereafter, in 1979, several South American 
countries signed the Convention for the Conservation and Management of the 
Vicuña in Lima (the Lima Convention), naming the Andean people as the 
primary beneficiaries of future vicuña use.254 The Lima Convention authorised 
limited trade domestic trade in vicuña under strict government control, and only 
where the animals are culled because a particular area has reached grazing 
capacity.255 
McAllister et al remarked that because the vicuña trade ban closed down 
the high-value market effectively, poaching incentives declined dramatically.256 
While poaching wasn‘t completely eradicated, it has the potential to increase 
substantially upon the lifting of the ban as illegal products might easily find their 
way onto the legal market.257 It is for this reason that McAllister et al suggest 
that in order for the trade in vicuña to provide the lucrative economic benefits it 
offers local communities, it would have to be combined with effective policing 
and appropriate certification to ensure that the product is from legal sources.258 
The trade in vicuña has unfortunately been characterised by issues 
relating to equity and poor rewards to local farmers, however the recovery of the 
species has displayed certain edifying features: the initial Appendix I listing 
provided an effective ban on lethal harvesting of the animals; the formal 
Convention mentioned above was signed by the range states where the species 
occurred; once recovery began, the appropriate institutions were established 
under the domestic legal frameworks and vicuñas were downlisted to Appendix 
II; and finally, there was an explicit commitment ensuring that local communities 
were included in the trade, and benefited therefrom.259 
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Jacobson argues that there is an almost complete parallel between 
vicuña and rhino because: both animals produce a valuable product which 
grows, and may be removed without harm to the animal; both involve 
populations in close proximity to impoverished communities; and both have 
been threatened with extreme poaching activities.260 It is thus conceivable that 
the success of the vicuña trade could be used in support of pro-trade arguments 
in the context of rhino horn, particularly in the sense that it demonstrates 
application of the sustainable use theory. 
However, while the similarities between vicuña and rhino horn are 
compelling, it is apparent that there are important differences that must be 
considered. Firstly, the vicuña market is classified as an oligopsony, meaning 
that there are a small number of buyers and a potentially large number of 
sellers.261 The market for rhino horn, on the other hand, features an unknown 
number of buyers. It may be speculated that because of the uses of rhino horn, 
it would have a sizeably larger base for which supply is restricted by the illegality 
of the trade. Secondly, part of the success of the recovery of vicuña lies in the 
total domestic and international ban on trade in their products, reinforced by 
regional cooperation and enforcement, which enabled a gradual shift towards a 
trade regime. This is distinguished from the rhino horn situation because the 
illegal trade in rhino horn flourishes despite the implementation of both a 
domestic an international trade ban. 
Perhaps lessons that may be taken from the vicuña case study are the 
importance of regional cooperation and community participation in successful 
conservation. The vicuña trade also provides a valuable example how 
sustainable use may be implemented without detriment to the species. This is of 
relevance in the context of rhino horn because it provides evidence that 
increased poaching and laundering of illegal product through legal channels 
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need not necessary pose the degree of threat to rhino populations as some 
envisage. 
4.2. African Elephant Ivory  
Alternatively, one may compare the trade in rhino horn to that of African 
elephant ivory. This is of particular relevance as CITES is currently investigating 
a possible legal trade in elephant ivory due to the persistent demand in Asia and 
the recent upsurge in poaching. However before one can do so, one must be 
cognisant of the similarities and differences between the two as these impact 
the degree to which they can be compared.262 Both the elephant and the rhino 
provide a product that commands an extremely high price, and are valued for 
the revenue they bring in through tourism and through lucrative trophy hunts.263 
Furthermore, both animals are difficult, and therefore costly, to protect from 
poachers. The most important difference, on the other hand, is that rhino horn 
regrows and can be harvested or removed from the animal without harm, while 
elephant ivory can only be harvested from the dead animal.264 In addition, rhino 
horn and ivory serve different purposes: elephant ivory essentially holds 
ornamental value, while rhino horn is considered to have both medicinal value, 
and ornamental (it is the prized material for the creation of carved dagger 
handles in Yemen).265 Furthermore rhino horn is easier to smuggle as it can be 
ground to a powder and concealed, whereas ivory must usually be in raw form 
as it is destined to be carved.266 
The comparison between rhino horn and elephant ivory is compelling 
because of the correlation between the poaching crisis facing the two. It is 
further useful to consider them in tandem because they face many of the same 
challenges in combating poaching. However, the means by which the products 
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can be obtained is of particular relevance in structuring a trade and developing a 
system of regular supply. 
In 1976, at the inception of CITES, the African elephant was listed under 
Appendix II. Trade was subject to a complex registration process (whereby all 
tusks were registered with CITES), and each state was required to set a quota 
indicating how many tusks would maintain its elephant population.267 
Regardless, elephant populations plummeted in the 1980s due to poaching for 
their ivory as a result of both legal and illegal trade and ‗exacerbated by a 
number of factors—unstable economies and the need for new sources of 
foreign exchange, political corruption in some nations and the greater availability 
of automatic weapons.‘268 Following the drastic decline in elephant populations 
between 1979 and 1989, the introduction of a resolution to reclassify the African 
elephant under Appendix I in 1990 effectively saw the introduction of a trade 
ban in elephant ivory.269  
The ivory trade ban saw a notable drop in the price of ivory and thus an 
accompanying decline in poaching as the incentives fell away.270 Potential 
reasons cited for this decrease in demand for ivory include unwillingness to 
purchase ivory due to the stigma created by the ban, and large stockpiles 
amassed in the 1980s.271 In 1997 southern African countries campaigned for the 
reclassification of African elephant into Appendix II with respect to the elephant 
populations of certain range states.272 Initially this proposal  was rejected as 
parties were concerned that there would be inadequate monitoring of such a 
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trade, however eventually a compromise was reached directed to conservation 
activities, .273 The result was an annotated Appendix II listing with respect to 
certain elephant populations for the purposes of an experimental one-off sale 
subject to the following conditions: that the consignment does not include 
poached ivory; that net revenues from sales be directed to conservation 
activities; that Namibia, Botswana and Zimbabwe remove their reservations to 
the Appendix I listing of the African elephant; and that the CITES Security 
Committee is satisfied that identified enforcement and control measures have 
been addressed.274  
This downlisting was followed by two one-off sales of ivory in 1999 and in 
2008, which have been cause for much debate and controversy.275The 
controversy stems from the debate as to whether one-off sales are the most 
effective approach to conserve the elephants, with proponents of trade arguing 
that the sales provide an incentive to conserve the animals, while others argue 
that they facilitate the marketing of illegal ivory.276 The latter argument against 
the legal trade in ivory maintains that illegal ivory is laundered in the process of 
legal sales, which formed the basis for opposition of several African counties to 
the initial one-off sale.277 Further the criticism levelled against the one-off legal 
sales is that it they are responsible for increased public demand.278 The 
compromises around trade were influenced substantially by the development of 
accurate monitoring programs (Monitoring Illegal Killing of Elephants, and the 
Elephant Trade Information System) to assess the effect of one-off sales on 
illegal trade and poaching.279 It is notable that while the proposed trade in rhino 
horn is not one of isolated sales, the arguments in opposition thereof are clearly 
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similar to those levelled against any legal trade in elephant ivory. It has, 
however, become apparent that the impact of the one-off sales remains 
uncertain. Bulte et al attempted to draw conclusions from the data available 
after the 1999 sales, and determined that there is no support for the hypothesis 
that the one-off sales had a significant impact on poaching.280 This conclusion is 
corroborated by Stiles, who states that there is no evidence to suggest that the 
1999 sales cause an increase in demand.281 If anything, it is probable that the 
one-off sales acted as a form of pressure release by increasing supply, and by 
incentivising conservation by way of letting range states benefit from their 
elephant populations.282 
The DMM Report also posits that evidence of a connection between one-
off sales and increased levels of illegal trade has yet to be provided.283 This 
document points out further that the illegal trade will continue for as long as the 
ban is in place, regardless of legal ivory in the system.284 Stiles concurs in this 
assessment, and suggests that the reason for the increased drive in demand is 
economic development in consumer countries such as China (where ivory is 
seen as a symbol of status and an auspicious material), combined with the 
depletion of the stockpiles of the 1980s.285 There are evident parallels between 
this explanation for the fluctuation in demand for ivory and for demand for rhino 
horn in that they both correspond with economic changes in Asia and potentially 
follow the depletion of stockpiles.  
Following the increase in poaching incidents over the last few years, 
Stoett argues that while a complete ban with respect to ivory may ultimately be 
detrimental, the resumption of trade without the appropriate controls will be 
equally unsuccessful.286 He refers to the conditions of the agreement with 
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Zimbabwe in 1997 (relating to the temporary lifting for the one-off sale in 1999) 
which largely foreshadow the principles and factors espoused by the Report: it 
is important that only stockpiled horn be traded and no elephants be killed for 
that purpose; that trade be halted immediately upon discovery of an infraction; 
and that resulting profits be invested into conservation. He also adds that it 
would be beneficial to do away with the ‗middle-man‘, as the element 
responsible for large mark-ups and exploitation of poachers.287 Stiles proposes 
that he legalisation of trade is the solution to vesting control of the ivory market, 
but that the implementation of any such trade would be premature until ‗ivory 
demand and the management and regulation problems are addressed.‘288 Such 
demand may be limited either through the creation of a stigma around the 
purchase of ivory that will permeate regardless of its legality, or by engaging 
ivory carvers in conservation process as they are a vital link in the supply 
chain.289  
Starting in 2006, the number of elephants poached in Africa has risen 
steadily despite the present trade ban, reaching its highest levels in 2011.290 
The data acquired through MIKE, which measures trends in levels of illegal 
trade and identifies factors associated with those trends, demonstrates this 
increase.291 This data also shows that in 2012 and the first half of 2013, the 
trend maintains levels close to those of 2011, the primary factors influencing the 
illegal trade being poverty, governance and demand.292 This case study is thus 
particularly compatible with that of the rhino, because in both cases there has 
been a marked increase in poaching despite the CITES trade ban being in 
place, necessitating the exploration of the legalisation as a potential solution. 
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The one–off sales are of interest because they were subject to the same 
arguments posed by proponents and opponents of trade as are posed with 
respect to rhino horn. The results of these sales remain uncertain, however it 
seems that the opening of trade for the purpose of sales did not have a 
discernable effect on poaching. At the same time it provided funds to supply 
states which are needed for conservation. These are relevant considerations in 
the context of rhino horn as they give an indication of how trade might affect 
demand, although one must bear in mind the differences between the two 
products. 
5. To legalise or not?  
The decision of whether or not the trade in rhino horn should be legalised lies in 
weighing up the different schools of thought on the topic, bearing in mind the 
reality currently being faced by rhino range states such as South Africa. In light 
of the government‘s decision to support a proposal for trade, it would appear 
that, despite the array of measures being implemented nationally to combat 
poaching, the authorities still believe it is necessary to radically alter the regime 
governing trade in rhino and its products.  
The economic arguments in favour of legalised trade are immediately 
attractive as the problems posed by the immunity of demand to increases in 
price are evident. The exorbitant prices fetched by rhino horn as a result of the 
trade ban invite the involvement of international organised crime syndicates who 
then vest control of the illegal trade, making it increasingly difficult to counteract 
poaching and smuggling of horn.  It is the price-inelasticity of demand that 
makes the argument of increased enforcement particularly problematic in that 
the more risk that is involved in obtaining the product by illegal means, the 
higher prices will rise because supply will be restricted and demand will not 
abate. Given this highly-inelastic demand, more enforcement will limit supply 
which will lead to a much sharper increase in prices rather than a drop in the 
quantity demanded. This increase in prices maintains the incentive to risk the 
penalties associated with poaching and exporting rhino horn. 
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The aforementioned point lends itself to the argument that the only way 
to restore balance to the trade would be for supply to rise so as to meet 
demand. It is, however, a valid concern that demand may be stimulated to 
exceed supply at the instigation of a legal trade. This is the case because we 
know so little about the nature and extent of the demand or how it is influenced. 
It is for the same reason that we cannot definitively determine whether the trade 
ban is more beneficial than harmful or vice versa—while he rhino population 
previously flourished under restrictive trade, it now plummets despite the trade 
ban. 
The price-inelasticity of demand further emphasises an important flaw in 
the demand-reduction approach. The fact that consumers are not affected by 
the increases in price means that they are unwilling to utilise alternatives or 
forgo the purchase of rhino horn due to the value they place on it, whether for 
reasons of status or tradition. Thus the efficacy of measures designed to reduce 
demand through education and awareness strategies will be too limited, and 
potentially too slow, to have the desired effect of reducing poaching in time. It 
would be more practical to raise awareness about the poaching of rhino in the 
context of luring consumers towards the legal market, and thus as part of a 
combined approach. 
 Notwithstanding the above, a persuasive argument can be made 
for the sustainable-use approach. This approach has been applied as a 
successful conservation strategy in South Africa in the past and it could be 
argued that trophy hunting, a form of sustainable-use, is what kept the poaching 
tide at bay for some time before it developed into a crisis. What is most 
compelling about this approach is that it allows landholders to benefit from their 
wildlife in such a way that those benefits can be incorporated back into 
conservation efforts, including anti-poaching measures. It thereby allows for a 
multi-pronged approach to the rhino poaching crisis by way of increased 
protection and enforcement measures at a domestic level, and the creation of a 
legal market at an international level. Importantly, sustainable-use addresses 
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one of the key concerns with respect to rhino on privately owned land, which is 
that landowners will sell their rhino or allow them to be poached because of the 
absence of an appropriate incentive to keep them on their property.  
 Further support for the sustainable–use approach is found in the 
vicuña case study. Firstly it demonstrates that a legalised trade can be workable 
and positively benefit local communities. This is of particular relevance in the 
South African context where there are underprivileged local communities who 
have very little incentive to assist in the protection of natural heritage from which 
they cannot benefit. Secondly, the Convention for the Conservation and 
Management of the Vicuña demonstrates the power of regional cooperation in 
the protection of shared assets. This also finds application in the South African 
context as we share a porous border with Mozambique, and the poaching crisis 
is also afflicting other Southern African states.    
The enforcement approach is the primary strategy being adopted by 
South Africa at the moment, characterised by stricter penalties for crimes 
involving rhino poaching, and increased and varied anti-poaching measures. 
The result has not been a decline in poaching activities, but rather an escalation 
in poaching as well as violence. It would seem that in the South African context 
the legalisation of trade is the only option left, which is perhaps why the DEA 
has proposed the legalisation of trade. It seems unlikely that South Africa will be 
able to make further financial provision or capacity available so as to reinforce 
anti-poaching measures and enforcement measures, as it appears that all 
possible alternatives to trade are being explored and utilised, and rhino are 
already being prioritised. 
Finally, the points raised around the laundering of illegally obtained rhino 
horn are of particular concern in the context of the trade in rhino horn because 
of uncertainty surrounding the willingness of Vietnam, as a consumer, to police 
a trade, and the capacity of South Africa to monitor trade as a supply country. 
Proposed solutions to this include technological identification mechanisms 
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combined with a trade structured so as to minimise the opportunity for the entry 
of illegal product into the legal market. While it may be asserted that these 
solutions are expensive and administratively burdensome, it seems that 
maintaining the necessary enforcement measures would be equally, if not more, 
expensive and burdensome in the long term. 
 The situation is summarised by Biggs et al. They posit that studies of 
other wildlife products suggest that a legal trade may reduce the incentives to 
poach if particular conditions are satisfied. Essentially they propose that 
regulators must be able eradicate any laundering of illegal product, the legal 
product must be easier and more reliable and cost effective to obtain than illegal 
product, trade does not stimulate demand, and consumers are willing to accept 
farmed/harvested product as opposed that of a wild animal.293 
If the aforegoing arguments and considerations are weighed it seems 
that the only way forward is through legalised trade in line with the sustainable-
use approach. The most effective way to address the poaching crisis would be a 
combined approach of legal trade, strict enforcement measures against the 
illegal trade, and potentially awareness campaigns to alert consumers as to the 
implications of buying on the illegal market and the benefits of buying on the 
legal market. The proposal drawn up to for the amendment of the CITES 
appendix for the purpose of lifting the ban should address all these concerns, 
and include a mechanism for the halting of the trade in the event that it does not 
operate as intended. The above analysis proposes an answer to the question 
whether trade should be legalised with respect to rhino horn. This discussion 
leaves the remaining questions of how likely it is that a proposal for trade will be 
accepted by CITES, and if so, what would such a trade look like. These 
questions will be explored in the next chapter, partly by considering the model 
for trade in African elephant ivory DMM Report as the beginnings of a ‗blueprint‘ 
for a trade in rhino horn. 
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CHAPTER 5 - A POSSIBLE MODEL FOR TRADE? 
1. What is the likelihood of a trade proposal being accepted? 
As discussed under chapter 3, the amendment of a listing requires a proposal 
that wins the vote of a two-thirds majority of the parties to CITES and little 
indication is given of what such a proposal would contain. The difficulty in 
preparing a successful proposal is illustrated by the repeated attempts to 
propose trade in African elephant ivory, dating back to 1990. Currently the DMM 
Report, which sets out a potential system of trade in ivory, explored in more 
detail below, is subject to a number of critical comments conveying concern as 
to the adverse consequences such a trade may have on elephant conservation, 
and alleging that ‗the study did not provide a series of options for  decision-
making mechanism for ivory trade,[and] that it may be too early to set up a 
mechanism given that the African Elephant Action Plan is just being 
implemented.‘294  
What is more, since 1994, South Africa has approached CITES twice 
before with the proposing trade in rhino horn products.295 It is apparent that the 
majority of parties have a cautious attitude to legalisation of trade in vulnerable 
species, and are more inclined towards the preservationist approach to 
conservation. While there is opposition to a legalised trade in rhino horn, it 
seems likely, that in light of the extensive measures already implemented at a 
domestic level, and the nature of the current poaching crisis, that CITES may 
entertain a proposal for trade more readily than previously. The success of the 
proposal will depend on how comprehensive and detailed the document is. The 
more research conducted, and planning prepared, the greater the possibility that 
the other members will be receptive to the proposal. It is conceivable that the 
proposal may be met with the same resistance offered against the proposed 
trade in elephant ivory, but the latter does offer a good example from which to 
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learn and improve the preparation of South Africa‘s proposal and responses to 
criticism.    
2. What would such a trade look like? Conditions for Future Trade in 
African Elephant Ivory: The Final Report 
In terms of proposing a trade regime, CITES offers little guidance as to what 
specific requirements should be seen to underpin such a regime.296 However, 
Milliken and Shaw suggest that many of the issues that need to be addressed 
can be gleaned from previous incidents of suggested wildlife trade, such as that 
relating to elephant ivory.297 These issues include the following: 
[T]he identification of trading partners and stakeholders participating in the 
system; the structure and trading protocols to be used in both source and 
consuming countries; the marking or identification system to differentiate legal 
horn from illegal stocks; the control measures to prevent horns and products of 
illegal origin from leaking into legal trade channels; other law enforcement and 
regulatory procedures to ensure compliance with reporting and stock inventory 
obligations; the use of the revenues that will; be generated through trade; and 
the delineation of public awareness initiatives to disseminate information and 
foster understanding for the system.298 
Other suggestions include the creation of a mechanism which would 
operate to halt trade in the event that it results in adverse consequences or 
there is a failure to comply with agreed regulations, and the institution of an 
oversight body to evaluate the proposal or audit implementation.299 
As previously mentioned, the Report was commissioned by the CITES 
Secretariat following the adoption of a resolution to propose such a decision-
making process at the 15thCoP.300 The Report is formulated in such a way as to 
address the issues set out in the Terms of Reference prescribed for said report, 
which include the following: the decision-making mechanisms and processes 
relating to ivory trade as they have been operating under CITES; comparative 
assessment of trade regimes in other high value commodities; basic principles 
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and factors applicable to a future trade in ivory; and an exploration of the 
conditions under which a legal trade could take place.301 The proposed system 
for a trade in ivory is designed so as to provide ‗a starting point for discussion 
and negotiation amongst primary and secondary stakeholders in the trade in 
ivory and the conservation of elephants‘.302 The Report explicitly provides that 
this system is not intended to constitute a blueprint for future trade.303 
2.1. Principles behind a future trade  
The conditions mentioned by Stoett above, are important elements in the 
Report‘s make-up. The Report provides that the fundamental principle behind 
any future trade in ivory is that ‗it should contribute positively to the long-term 
conservation of elephants and their habitats in Africa.‘304 Consequently, 
according to the Report, and as mentioned above, any trade should not be 
based on ivory harvested from elephants killed for that purpose.305 This 
introduces one of the primary differences between the proposed trade in rhino 
horn and elephant ivory: trade in rhino horn would have to allow for harvesting 
from the animals to supply the trade as they would not be harmed in the process 
and it would encourage growth in, rather than deplete, the population. However 
the fundamental principle referred to above remains the same in the context of 
both rhino horn and elephant ivory.  
 The Report lists a series of basic principles and factors that could 
be used to guide a future trade in African elephant ivory, including sustainable 
use principles and the African Elephant Action Plan.306 Related to sustainable 
use, the Report suggests that that the proceeds of trade should be returned to 
landowners so as to enable them to realise their investment in maintaining the 
animals on their property, and that a future trade ensures ‗returns to 
stakeholders (i.e. states, private and communal sector landholders) which will 
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provide incentives to conserve and manage elephants sustainably on their 
land.‘307 
 These considerations find application in the context of a proposed 
trade in rhino horn in light of the concerns around the current disincentives for 
landholders to keep rhino horn on their land. The exorbitant costs of security 
against poachers, and the inherent risks involved, mean that rhinos are 
becoming a liability to landholders, and private landowners in particular may 
become less inclined to keep or protect the rhino on their property. Additional 
notable principles mentioned in the report include the idea that in order for trade 
to be sustainable in the long-run, it needs to be self-financing and thus not 
dependant on outside funding.308 Furthermore it needs to be easy to comply 
with so as to make it more attractive than the illegal means of acquiring the 
same product, or taking shortcuts.309 
2.2. The Central Ivory Selling Organisation  
The Report emphasises the importance of coordinated and secure 
marketing mechanisms as to reduce the steps between the producers of ivory 
and those who carve ivory.310 The utility of this approach lies in that it narrows 
any opportunities for laundering of illegal product through legal channels, which 
is a key concern in legalising any trade in wildlife.311 This also assists in 
achieving the outcome of removing the middle-man from the supply chain. The 
Report proposes that this may be achieved via the establishment of a central 
ivory exchange in Africa.  
 Borrowing from the practices of the De Beers cartel in the 
management of the diamond trade, the Report suggests the establishment of a 
Central Ivory Selling Organisation (CISO).312 The CISO will form a single outlet 
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for the sales of all raw ivory coming out of Africa; it would be funded by way of a 
levy on ivory sales agreed to by buyers and sellers; and would operate on the 
basis of annual quota applications received from range states which are 
subsequently assessed for sustainability and consistency with the countries‘ 
management plan for elephants (also submitted to the CISO).313 
 The organisation would operate semi-autonomously as it would 
remain accountable to CITES and the relevant elephant range states.314 It is 
thus proposed that the CISO be structured as follows: the organisation would be 
headed by a CEO in control of three divisions each run by a Director; the first 
division relates to ivory producers, and its functions would include assessing 
and assisting in the applications from range states for admission as suppliers of 
ivory and thence making recommendations to CITES as to their admission, spot 
auditing of the producers ivory stocks, and attending to the logistics of moving 
ivory to the CISO; the second division will attend to sales of ivory, which would 
take place as often as suits sellers, buyers and the price-setting strategy of the 
CISO, and will thus also be responsible for marking and tagging, certifying and 
exporting ivory; finally, the third division will manage ivory processers by 
attending to the admission of, and liaising with, buyers as well as conducting 
spot audits on buyers‘ premises and monitoring functions.315 
 The Report lists further detailed conditions that would characterise 
the proposed ivory-trading system in addition to the CISO. Firstly, the 
international trade will not authorise trade between African range states and all 
ivory put forward for sale would originate from government ivory stores.316 
Range states would have to satisfy a number of criteria in order to qualify for 
participation in the CISO, including an undertaking to return all the proceeds of 
ivory sales to the landholder from which the ivory originated, to supply all raw 
ivory directly to CISO, and comply with the exiting CITES requirements for the 
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marking of ivory.317 Buyers on the other hand would constitute any individuals or 
governments who own ivory carving/processing factories and who meet a series 
of CITES requirements.318 The target market in the context of a trade in rhino 
horn would of course be different due to the alternative uses of the product, and 
the CITES requirements for qualification as a buyer would have to be altered 
accordingly. This may prove challenging, in light of the uncertainties surrounding 
the existing market, to identify particular characteristics buyers must satisfy.  
Presumably buyers of raw rhino horn could range from practitioners of 
traditional medicine, to pharmacies, to individuals and even carving facilities. 
Thus distilling requirements that all could meet (easily), and subsequently be 
monitored for compliance, may be more complex.    
The primary goals of De Beers in the diamond trade, were to achieve the 
best possible returns, and to control the market.319 Similarly the aim of CISO 
would be to secure the value of ivory for the producers thereof, so that this value 
is reinvested in the conservation of the animals and the land where it 
originated.320 It is for this reason that the control that would be offered CISO in 
manipulating the market price is of vital importance. The CISO would not over-
price ivory, as this would encourage illegal trade, and thus poaching, in an effort 
to undermine the CISO‘s profits, nor would it sell ivory at artificially low prices.321 
The reasoning behind the latter is that flooding the market could stimulate 
demand.322 This feature of the CISO thus addresses one of the primary 
concerns with respect to the legalisation of trade in rhino horn: that in flooding 
the market to lower prices, so as to disincentivise poaching, will result in an 
insatiable demand as a result of new consumers coming to the market who 
could previously not afford the product.  This outcome is further cushioned 
against by the inclusion of a mechanism whereby the trade may be halted. 
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 It is pointed out in the Report that the system proposed for trade 
will require time to be implemented.323 The requisite stages of planning, 
stakeholder negotiation and consultation are outlined in the chapter on decision-
making mechanisms.324 This chapter suggests the adoption of a ‗multi-level 
decision-making process‘ and envisages a number of steps from the CITES 
agreement to allow trade, to the development of a regional conservation and 
management plan and the agreement between producer and processor 
countries to establish the CISO.325 
 CISO is structured so that a close link is established between 
supply and demand.326 The result being that there is greater transparency in the 
trade process, allowing stakeholders to see that a viable market has been 
established, which is protected from the criminal syndicates, and thereby 
encouraging participation in the legal trade. Furthermore the top-down and 
bottom-up decision-making mechanisms, involving a full range of stakeholders, 
ensures that the process is inclusive and stakeholders are assured that their 
interests are protected.327 Control is thus vested from the criminal syndicates 
who currently control both supply and demand.328  
2.3. A Central Selling Organisation for rhino horn?  
Biggs et al propose that a Central Selling Organisation (CSO) may be adapted 
for use in the context of legal trade in rhino horn.329  Drawing from the Report, 
they suggest that the CSO could be formulated much like the CISO and, 
through negotiation and management of the sale of horn, could encourage 
buyers to partake of the more cost-effective and reliable legal trade.330 The CSO 
would then be accountable to white rhino range states and the CITES CoP, and 
the proceeds gained via a levy placed on each horn sold could be used as 
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funding. Funding could contribute towards the enforcement of the ban, ensuring 
returns from the sale of horns go towards landholders where the horn 
originated, and ensuring that rhino horn is harvested humanely and 
sustainably.331 
 They also argue that a CSO could avoid or manage the potential 
uncertainties and risks in legal trade in the following ways: only the CSO should 
be allowed to sell horn to buyers, and the stockpiles of the latter should be 
audited regularly; South African stockpiles of horn could be used to attract 
buyers to the legal trade; CISO should work closely with consumer countries to 
ensure that strict penalties are enforced where buyers operate illegally; and a 
monitoring system should be developed whereby CSO can foster an 
understanding of the market and demand, so as to enable its adaptive 
management.332 
 It is evident from the above, that the decision-making mechanism 
and conditions for trade espoused by the Report address a number of the 
primary concerns that arise in the contact of a legal trade in rhino horn. The 
proposed CSO is of primary importance in making this model for trade suitable 
for rhino horn, although fundamental differences in the nature of the products 
and the demand for each necessitate adaptations in the requirements to be met 
by buyers and suppliers thereof. For example, a system of trade relating to rhino 
horn would have to provide for the supply of harvested horn, as well as horn 
from dehorned rhinos and existing stockpiles. It is, however, acknowledged that 
this Report is intended to be a starting point and it remains to be seen whether 
the range of stakeholders envisaged as being involved in this decision-making 
process is in fact practical, and whether monitoring compliance with the legal 
system is possible. The proposed system is noticeably lacking in ‗teeth‘ in 
respect of non-compliance with the system, presumably a contravention of the 
legal system would mean one is suspended or deregistered as a buyer or seller 





and thus the incentive to comply would come from a desire to participate. One 
may question whether this is in fact sufficient, and whether the system should 
perhaps incorporate explicit compliance and enforcement provisions, as well as 
a mechanism for the withdrawal of the trade system in the event that it poaching 




CHAPTER 6 - CONCLUSION 
It is apparent from the rhino poaching statistics that the current regulatory 
regime governing trade and preservation of this species is not able to counter 
the effects of a growing illegal trade involving organised criminal syndicates. 
The domestic measures implemented to restrict supply have simply caused 
prices on the illegal market to escalate, and may prove unsustainable in the long 
term.  
As a result, the lifting of the trade ban on the commercial trade in rhino 
products, and thus the creation of a legal trade in competition to the illegal 
market, is discussed as a solution to ease the threat posed by poaching. This 
proposal is steeped in controversy as the opinions of proponents for trade, and 
those against, differ greatly as a result of the multiplicity of risks involved. Upon 
examination of the key opposing theories, it becomes apparent that the 
arguments for trade are more persuasive when considered in the current 
context and in light of the situation in South Africa. The utilities of the 
sustainable-use approach to wildlife conservation find application where a 
number of rhino reside on private game farms, communal land, and national 
parks, and these rhino are continually being lost to poachers. This approach 
benefits the landholder, while meeting the demand for rhino horn through legal 
means.  
The notion of sustainable use is reflected in both case studies explored. 
In the context of the trade in vicuña, sustainable use is applied to the benefit of 
local communities. While the case of the vicuña is not directly comparable to 
that of rhino, it demonstrates the value of regional cooperation in species 
conservation and in the successful implementation of trade bans and 
regulations. It also provides an example of sustainable use trade that has not 
been detrimental to the species which had previously recovered from over-
exploitation, nor has it led to noticeable growth in poaching for the illegal trade.   
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In the context of the African elephant, sustainable use has been applied 
in the form of one-off sales for the benefit of range states supporting elephant 
populations, to enable them to gather funds for conservation purposes. These 
sales have not been shown to cause a discernable increase in poaching by 
stimulating demand. Furthermore the insistence on maintaining  ban on trade in 
ivory has not quelled the elephant poaching crisis which has developed and 
necessitated proposals for trade, which are being explored by CITES. 
Having concluded that trade should be legalised, the first hurdle is to 
consider is whether such a proposal would be accepted by CITES so as to allow 
for international commercial trade. If one has regard to the previous 
unsuccessful attempts to submit such a proposal, and the persistent resistance 
to trade in African elephant ivory, it is evident how challenging such a proposal 
is likely to be. However, South Africa has the potential to be successful due to 
the fact that they have largely exhausted the alternative options, and provided 
that the proposal submitted addresses all the potential concerns that may arise 
in the context of a legalise trade.  
It is then instructive to see what such a trade would look like. The Report 
setting out a decision-making mechanism and conditions for a future trade in 
African elephant ivory provides a unique opportunity to study a model of how a 
similar legal trade may be structured and implemented. While there are 
important differences between rhino horn and elephant ivory, it is interesting to 
note that the majority of the principles espoused by the Report, and the design 
of the decision-making mechanism and conditions for trade, particularly the 
operation of the CISO, address a number of the key arguments against a 
legalised trade in rhino horn. Furthermore it may prove useful in formulating the 
trade proposal or a similar report for the purposes of future trade in rhino horn. 
In summary, this dissertation has sought to demonstrate that trade, as 
one of the only remaining options, should be pursued subject to strict regulation 
and with clearly articulated and enforced parameters implemented and 
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incorporated into both international law and domestic legislation. . In order for 
the trade ban to be lifted South Africa, and other affected range states, would 
have to submit a trade proposal to CITES at the next CoP, which is only set to 
take place in 2016.It is argued that the foundation for a legal trade in rhino horn 
could take 6-10 years to develop,333 which could mean that pursuing legalised 
trade might come too late to be of any value.  
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